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INJECTING FAULT INTO A NO-FAULT SYSTEM:
THE AGGRESSOR DEFENSE IN WORK-RELATED
FIGHT CASES*
Judge Melissa Lin Jones"
INTRODUCTION

*

Mr. Rodney Dickerson stepped aboard a pallet mounted on the front
of a forklift and placed a case of vodka on his shoulder; as the pallet
ascended to the second floor of the warehouse, it broke, and Mr.
Dickerson fell to the ground. He sustained a concussion, multiple
strains, and multiple contusions. He was awarded wage loss
benefits and medical benefits.

*

While operating a pipe-cutting grinder without using the safety
shield, Mr. Edward F. Mooney severely injured his left hand. He
was awarded temporary total disability benefits, interest on
accrued benefits, medical benefits, and bad faith penalties.2

*

Out of boredom, Mr. Roman Melech repeatedly pulled on
his retractable identification badge. The badge snapped back, hit

This article is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Judicial Studies
degree program at the University of Nevada, Reno. Special thanks go out to Judge David B. Torrey,
Judge Bruce E. Moore, and Dr. James T. Richardson for their insightful comments to improve this
article. In addition, without the support of Steven Marshall Jones and Bradley Steven Klemens this
article would not have been possible.
**

Judge Jones is admitted to practice law in New York, the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia. She is not engaged in the practice of law, and the contents of this
article are not intended to provide legal advice.

Views expressed in this article represent

commentary concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. These views
should not be mistaken for the official views of the District of Columbia Department of
Employment Services nor for Judge Jones' opinion in the context of any specific case. The
views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the policies of the District of
Columbia Department of Employment Services, and no official endorsement by the District of
Columbia Department of Employment Services is intended or should be inferred.
1. Dickerson, 2011 WL 3401150, at *2, *4, *19 (D.C. Dep't Emp't Servs. July 27, 2011).
2. Mooney, 1997 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 433, at *34, *19 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.
Dec. 23, 1997).
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him in the eye, and scratched his cornea. He was awarded medical
benefits.
Stupidity is compensable. In the no-fault system of workers'
compensation, compensability is determined by the relationship between
an event causing an injury and employment, not the relationship
between an event causing an injury and a claimant's culpability,
clumsiness, impulsiveness, incompetence, etc. 4 If the accidental injury5
arises out of and in the course of employment, the claimant is entitled to
benefits without regard to foreseeability or responsibility 6-unless the
injury is sustained during a work-related fight started by the claimant.
On July 24, 1982, the District of Columbia private-sector Workers'
Compensation Act ("Act") became effective. Under this new law,
"[e]very employer subject to this chapter shall be liable for
compensation for injury or death without regard to fault as a cause of
the injury or death." 9
This broad scope of liability for injuries arising out of and in
the course of employment stems from a common purpose of all
workers' compensation systems, namely protecting claimants by
providing "a practical and expeditious remedy for work-related
accidents or injuries [while simultaneously limiting] the economic
burden on employers by providing that their liability under the Act [is]
'exclusive."'o When tort principles no longer apply, even actions

3. Melech, 2007 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 306, at *3-5, *11 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.
July 24, 2007) (explaining that the claim for wage loss benefits was denied because Mr.
Melech's lost time did not exceed the statutory waiting period established by section 32-1505
of the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979).
4. Id. at *6.
5.

To satisfy the requirement of an accidental injury, the claimant only needs to prove

"something unexpectedly [went] wrong within the human frame." Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 506 A.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. 1986).
6. See id. at 1128 & nn.1-2, 1129 n.4 (defining the term "injury" and noting that "the
employer [is] responsible for all occupational injuries, regardless of fault").
7. See Bird v. Advance Sec. (Bird 1l), H&AS No. 84-69, OWC No. 015644, at 1 (D.C.
Dep't of Emp't Servs. June 7, 1985).
8. The District of Columbia has two workers' compensation acts in full force and effect
simultaneously. In addition to the Act which governs claims brought by private sector employees,
D.C. CODE §§ 32-1501 to 1545 (2001), the District of Columbia Government Comprehensive
Merit Personnel Act of 1978 ("Public Sector Workers' Compensation Act"), governs workers'
compensation claims brought by public sector employees, D.C. CODE § 1-601.01 to 636.03
(2001).
9. § 32-1503(b).
10. Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658, 660 (D.C. 1979).
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ordinarily classified as foolhardy are compensable."
In 1985, the Director of the Department of Employment
Services ("Director") conducted administrative appellate review of
workers' compensation decisions. 12 In Bird v. Advance Security, the
Director ruled that in order for injuries sustained in a fight to be
compensable:
1. [T]he employment required the combatants to work in an
environment which [brought] them together often enough for their
temperaments and emotions to interact under strains of the workplace
and which tended to increase the likelihood of friction between them;
and
2. a finding that the injured employee was not the aggressor.
In other words, if a claimant is at fault for initiating a physical
altercation and is injured as a result of that altercation, the claimant's
resulting injuries are not compensable pursuant to the aggressor
defense. 14
The workers' compensation system is a no-fault system. The
relationship between the employee's culpability and the event causing
an injury is supposed to be irrelevant, but the Bird test injects fault into
this no-fault system. Should the rules differ when the injury arises out
of and in the course of a work-related, physical altercation initiated by
the claimant?
"[T]he Act contains no exclusion from liability for injuries that
result from poor judgment or misconduct;"15 however, the District of
Columbia and a majority of states recognize the aggressor defense.
Louisiana 6 and California" (among others) have codified the defense,
11. See § 32-1504(b).
12. See, e.g., Bird II, H&AS No. 84-96, at 1. In December 2004, administrative appellate
review of Compensation Orders was delegated to the Compensation Review Board. § 32-1521.01.
Before the creation of the Compensation Review Board, appeals of Compensation Orders were

taken to the Director of the Department of Employment Services.
13. BirdII, H&AS No. 84-96, at 6.
14. Id.
15. Carter, 2005 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 105, at *7-8 (Dep't of Emp't Servs. June 21, 2005)
(explaining that a claimant, after clocking out and before vacating the employer's premises, who was
injured when she was handcuffed for attempting to speak to an individual under arrest was awarded
workers compensation benefits).

16. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1081(l)(c) (West through 2014 Legis. Sess.) ("(1) No
compensation shall be allowed for an injury caused: . . . (c) to the initial physical aggressor in an
unprovoked physical altercation, unless excessive force was used in retaliation against the initial
aggressor.").
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and other states have developed it through caselaw.' 8
Some states recognize the aggressor defense as a total bar to
eligibility for workers' compensation benefits; some states reject the
aggressor defense as a bar to receiving workers' compensation benefits;
some states that once recognized the aggressor defense as a bar to
eligibility for workers' compensation benefits have come to reject that
defense in whole or in part. 19 The District of Columbia recognizes the
aggressor defense, 2 0 but if the aggressor defense is to be included
among other valid defenses in District of Columbia workers'
compensation cases, it must be as a result of legislative action not
judicial flat injecting fault into a no-fault system.
I. THE GRABER CASE

Graber v. Sequoia Restaurant is the most recent District of
Columbia workers' compensation case to apply the aggressor defense
to an on-the-job fight.21 On August 9, 2009, Mr. Todd Allen Graber
worked as a food server at Sequoia Restaurant. 22 On that day, he was
drinking on the job.
He also "was behaving aggressively towards
his co-workers"; 24 inside the restaurant, Mr. Graber "engaged in a
heated discussion with a co-worker, Mr. Mehdi Brewer.... although
the substance of those words [is] unclear." 2 5 Another co-worker
separated Mr. Graber and Mr. Brewer.26
Mr. Brewer walked away toward the service area but stopped and
began talking to someone.27 He then turned fully away and was

17. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(7) (West 2011) ("(a) Liability for the compensation
provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person except as otherwise
specifically provided in Sections 3602, 3706, and 4558, shall, without regard to negligence, exist
against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course
of the employment and for the death of any employee if the injury proximately causes death, in
those cases where the following conditions of compensation concur: . .. (7) Where the injury does
not arise out of an altercation in which the injured employee is the initial physical aggressor.")
18. See infra app. A, for a complete list of states that recognize an aggressor
defense.
19. See infra app. A.
20. See infra app. A.
21. Graber (Graber1), 2011 WL 1980628, at *3 (Dep't of Emp't Servs. Apr. 13, 2011).
22. Id at *1.
23. Id. at *3.
24. Id. at *5.
25. Id at *2.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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walking into the service area pass the computer terminal.2 8 While Mr.
Brewer was walking away, Mr. Graber struck Mr. Brewer in the back of
the head.29 In response, Mr. Brewer pivoted and punched Mr. Graber in
the face.30 Mr. Graber fell to the floor.
At a local hospital, Mr. Graber underwent a right decompressive
craniectomy.

32

He "remained hospitalized for approximately five

weeks" and "was
diagnosed with aright temporal
lobe
33
intraparenchymal and basal ganglia hemorrhage."
Even after
discharge from the hospital, Mr. Graber continued to treat for
uncontrolled seizures and migraines.3 4
In order to determine Mr. Graber's entitlement to workers'
compensation benefits, an administrative law judge noted that "to be
compensable an injury must both arise out of, and in the course of the
employment." 35 Then, the administrative law judge analyzed whether
Mr. Graber was the aggressor:
[I]t is clear to the Undersigned that the Claimant was the aggressor on
August 9, 2009. Under the Bird analysis, the Undersigned does find
that the nature of the Claimant's employment does require regular
contact with his co-workers, including Mr. Brewer which can
cause a strain on emotions increasing workplace friction. However,
the Claimant fails the second prong of the Bird test.
The surveillance footage the Undersigned reviewed (as well as the
corroborating witness testimony) shows Mr. Brewer walking away
from the Claimant when the altercation occurred. Indeed, in the instant
before the Claimant pushed or struck the back of Mr. Brewer's head,
Mr. Brewer was clearly walking away from the Claimant and had his
back fully towards the Claimant. The Claimant chose to come from
behind Mr. Brewer while he was walking away and physically attack
Mr. Brewer. As such, the Claimant can clearly be labeled the
aggressor. 36

28. See id
29. See id.
30. See id
31. See id. It is unclear whether the punch or the impact with the floor rendered Mr. Graber
unconscious.
32. See id
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Id. at *3. (citation omitted).
36. Id. at *4.
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In the end, the administrative law judge ruled that Mr. Graber's
injury was not compensable because he had acted with a willful
intention to injure Mr. Brewer and because he had been the aggressor:
The Claimant argues several points in support of his contention that
he is not the aggressor in the above altercation. First, the Claimant
argues that the "aggressor defense" appears nowhere in the Act and as
such is not a viable defense. The Claimant quotes § 32-1503(b) which
states that the "Employer shall be liable for compensation for injury or
death without regard to fault as a cause of the injury or death."
However, as outlined above, the Claimant fails in this argument as the
Claimant fails to note that § 32-1503(d) limits liability for
compensation due to an injury to the employee, the Claimant, if the
injury was occasioned solely by his intoxication or by his willful
intention to injure himself or another. Thus, contrary to the Claimant's
argument, the aggressor defense does find support in the statute in §
32-1503(d).
The Claimant points out that many cases which have follow[ed]
Bird involve disputes between coworkers that [were] either prolonged
or cases where the Claimant had acted in a physically aggressive
manner. First, the argument that the length of the altercation is
determinative in whether the Claimant is the aggressor is rejected.
Whether or not the altercation lasted a matter of a few minutes or a few
hours does not negate the fact that the Claimant came from behind Mr.
Brewer and initiated physical contact in an aggressive way. No injury
would have occurred to the Claimant had he not pushed/hit Mr. Brewer
aggressively in the head, regardless of whether or not this occurred a
few seconds, a few minutes, or a few hours into the altercation. The
end result, regardless of time, is that the Claimant was the aggressor on
the date of injury.

... Claimant's willful intention to injure another, Mr. Brewer, caused
his injury to occur, and thus liability for compensation shall not apply.
As I find the Claimant to be the aggressor in the altercation of August
9, 2009, no further discussion is warranted, including the
Claimant's intoxication on that day, which also defeats his claim. I
find an accidental injury did not occur on that date within the scope of
the [A]ct as the Claimant was the aggressor. With this finding, all
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other issues are rendered moot.37
Mr. Graber's request for temporary total disability benefits from
August 9, 2009 to the date of the formal hearing and continuing and for
medical benefits was denied so he filed an appeal.
A. Mr. Graber'sArguments on Appeal to the Compensation Review
Board
On appeal to the Compensation Review Board, Mr. Graber
asserted the administrative law judge had erred in several ways. The
arguments important to the aggressor defense are as follows: "[(1)] Was
the presumption of compensability properly applied? [(2)] Were Mr.
Graber's injuries occasioned solely by his intoxication or solely by a
willful intent to injur[e] Mr. Brewer? [(3)] Does the aggressor defense
impermissibly bar Mr. Graber's recovery under the [Act]?" 3 8
Initially, Mr. Graber attempted to convince the Compensation
Review Board that he was not the aggressor; however, "[t]he scope
of review by the [Compensation Review Board] is limited
to
making a determination as to whether the factual findings of the
appealed Compensation Order are based upon substantial evidence in
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are in accordance with the applicable law."3 9 The Compensation
Review Board is constrained to uphold a Compensation Order that is
supported by substantial evidence even if the record also contains
substantial evidence to support a contrary conclusion and even if the
Compensation Review Board might have reached a contrary conclusion
based upon an independent review of the record.40
The administrative law judge unequivocally had ruled Mr.
Graber was the aggressor. 4 1 Because the administrative law judge's
ruling was supported by substantial evidence, the Compensation
Review Board accepted Mr. Graber's status as the aggressor and lacked
42
authority to reweigh the evidence on that issue.
As for Mr. Graber's other arguments, the Compensation

37. Id. at *5-6 (citation omitted).
38. Graber (Graber II), 2011 WL 3625289, at *1-2 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. July 25,
2011).
39. Id. at *2.
40. Marriott Int'l v. D.C. Dep't Emp't Servs., 834 A.2d 882, 885-86 (D.C. 2003) (noting
"substantial evidence" as evidence that a reasonable person might accept to support a conclusion).
41. GraberlI,2011 WL3625289,at*3-4.
42. Id.
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Review Board recognized the Act contains several presumptions:
In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation
under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary:
(1) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter;
(2) That sufficient notice of such claim has been given;
(3) That the injury was not occasioned solely by the intoxication
of the injured employee; and
(4) That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the
injured employee to injure or kill himself or another. 43
However, the Compensation Review Board directed that the
presumptions be read in conjunction with §32-1503(d) of the Act:" "[l t
is presumed that a work-related injury is compensable unless
intoxication or a willful intention to injure or kill oneself or another is
the sole cause of the injury. If either exception applies, the injury
does not arise out of the employment and is not compensable."45
Mr. Graber's injuries were not caused solely by his intoxication,
but it was unclear if his injury solely was the result of a willful
intention to injure Mr. Brewer.46 If this issue had been dispositive, it
would have required a remand for additional fact-finding, but
ultimately, Mr. Graber's status as the aggressor and his pursuit of a
private animosity with no connection to his employment barred his
eligibility for workers' compensation benefits regardless of any willful
intention to injure Mr. Brewer:
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding
that the work-related altercation was over: Mr. Graber and Mr. Brewer
walked in different directions, physically had separated, and had
resumed their respective duties when Mr. Graber struck Mr. Brewer in
the back of his head from behind... . Because the ruling that Mr.

43. D.C. CODE § 32-1521 (2001).
44. § 32-1503(d) ("Liability for compensation shall not apply where injury to the employee
was occasioned solely by his intoxication or by his willful intention to injure or kill himself or
another.").

45.
46.

GraberII, 2011 WL 3625289, at *3.
Id.
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Graber was the aggressor is supported by substantial evidence, this
tribunal simply cannot review and reweigh evidence anew as Mr.
Graber would prefer.
In addition, Mr. Graber argues that the aggressor defense inserts
into the Act an impermissible element of fault. We disagree.
Although workers' compensation generally is a no-fault system, in
specific instances such as intoxication, willful misconduct, and the
aggressor defense, there is an element of fault that takes the activity
and its consequences beyond the employment situation. Mr. Graber's
argument may have been more persuasive if the altercation had
been an uninterrupted one; however, because "Mr. Brewer was clearly
walking away from the Claimant and had his back fully towards the
Claimant [and because Mr. Graber] chose to come from behind Mr.
Brewer while he was walking away and physically attack Mr. Brewer,"
the situation was a willful intent to injure another that degenerated into
an altercation of private animosity and vengeance with no work
connection. 47
Often in fight cases, as in Graber, several concepts are
intertwined to reach the result. Consequently, understanding the facts
of the Bird case and the justification for the Bird test is instrumental to
assessing whether the Bird test impermissibly injects fault into a no-fault
system.
II. THE BIRD TEST

According to Officer David R. Bird, on October 5, 1983, he
received a telephone call at his post in the lobby of the World Bank
where he worked as a security officer.48 Officer Bird could not leave
his post to deliver an emergency message to fellow officer Percy
Tappin so he tried to reach Officer Tappin by calling a telephone in
the parking garage used by World Bank employees.49
Officer Tappin was stationed in a booth at the garage entrance, and
parking attendants employed by Diplomat Parking frequently
answered this telephone.o In fact, Mr. Sharif Mohamed, a Diplomat

47.
48.
0015644,
49.
50.

Id. at 4 (alteration in original) (footnotes ommitted).
Bird v. Advanced Sec. & Am. Motorists Ins. Co. (Bird 1), H&AS 84-69, OWC No.
at 3 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. June 1, 1985).
Id.
Id.
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Parking employee, answered the telephone.
Officer Bird told Mr. Mohamed there was an emergency call for
Officer Tappin, but Mr. Mohamed hung up the phone.52 Mr. Mohamed
hung up on Officer Bird two more times when Officer Bird called
back."
While Officer Bird was on break, he accused Mr. Mohamed of
being impolite.54 Mr. Mohamed challenged Officer Bird to a fight, and
Officer Bird said he would take it up with Mr. Mohamed's supervisor,
Mr. Abraham Ankele.
The next day, Officer Bird arrived at the World Bank
approximately thirty minutes before his shift; he regularly did so in
order to change into his uniform, to punch-in, and to report to his post.56

He went to the locker room, and Mr. Mohamed and Mr. Ankele were
there.
Mr. Ankele asked Officer Bird about the telephone incident. 8
During this discussion, Mr. Mohamed approached Officer Bird, made
obscene gestures, and used profanities."
The verbal exchange continued outside the locker room, and Mr.
Mohamed hit Officer Bird on the head. 60 As Officer Bird tried to
defend himself, he and Mr. Mohamed fell to the ground.
This account is Officer Bird's version of the events.62 Mr.
Mohamed, Mr. Ankele, and Officer Shadee Ansari offered different
versions of the events.
According to Mr. Mohamed, the telephone calls on October 5,
1983, were from a female who wanted to speak to Officer Bird.64 Mr.
Mohamed did not relay the call to Officer Bird; instead, Mr. Mohamed
told the female to call the security office.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Bird called Mr. Mohamed to ask why
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id at 4.
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5-7.
Id at 5.
Id
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Mr. Mohamed had told the female to call the security office.66 Officer
Bird called Mr. Mohamed an obscene name, and Officer Bird challenged
Mr. Mohamed to a fight at the end of the day. 6 7
The next day, Mr. Mohamed and Mr. Ankele were in the locker
room when Officer Bird arrived. 8 Officer Bird began talking in an
aggressive tone and asked why Mr. Mohamed had not waited for him
after work the day before.6 9 Then, as Mr. Mohamed was leaving the
locker room, Mr. Ankele left to call security, and Officer Bird began
hitting Mr. Mohamed on the head.7 0 Both men fell to the ground.71
Mr. Ankele provided a third version of the events.72 According to
him, Mr. Mohamed told him that a female had called for Officer Bird
and that Mr. Mohamed did not transfer the call or deliver a message
to Officer Bird.73 Mr. Mohamed also told Mr. Ankele that Officer
Bird came to the parking-attendant booth and yelled at Mr.
Mohamed.74
The next day, Mr. Ankele and Officer Bird were in the locker
room when Mr. Mohamed entered.75 Officer Bird brought up the
telephone calls, and the two men began arguing and name-calling;
Officer Bird challenged Mr. Mohamed to a fight, but Mr. Ankele did
not see who threw the first punch.7 6
Finally, Officer Ansari saw Officer Bird and Mr. Mohamed in a
heated argument outside the parking attendant booth.n Each was
holding the other by the collar, and when Mr. Ankele tried to separate
them, he was pushed away.
Officer Bird injured his right thumb during the fight so he filed a
claim for permanent partial disability benefits.79 At the formal hearing,
Officer Bird's employer argued that because the fight had taken place
before the start of Officer Bird's tour of duty, it did not arise out of

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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and in the course of employment.8 0 The administrative law judge
rejected this argument.
Officer Bird's employer also argued that Officer Bird was not
injured while acting in furtherance of his employment because the
telephone call that had precipitated the animosity was not workrelated.8 2 Without making any specific finding as to the content of the
telephone call, the administrative law judge rejected this argument as
well. 83 Even assuming the call was personal, an on-the-job assault is
compensable if "the work of the participants brought them together
and created the relations and conditions which resulted in the clash." 8 4
Because the fight had taken place in a locker room shared by the
participants, because Officer Bird had passed by Mr. Mohamed's duty
post in order to report to his own post, and because Officer Bird's patrol
of the premises had brought him in contact with Mr. Mohamed, the
conditions of employment had created the environment for the
fight.85
Finally, Officer Bird's employer argued the claim was barred by
Officer Bird's willful intention to injure another.86 In response, the
administrative law judge specifically ruled, "[b]ased on the testimony
of Ankele, whom I find to be a credible and a candid witness, I find
that the evidence does not establish who struck the first blow."87
Although Officer Bird had shown aggressive behavior, the
administrative law judge could not conclude he had willfully intended
to injure Mr. Mohamed.
The administrative law judge recommended awarding Officer Bird
five percent permanent partial disability of his right thumb, but on
appeal, the Director rejected the administrative law judge's
recommendation and denied Officer Bird's request for benefits.8 9
Although the Director found no error regarding the administrative law
judge's conclusion on the issue of "in the course of employment" so far
as it related to Officer Bird's pre-tour activities, the Director
disagreed with the administrative law judge's broad reading of
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id at 7.
Id
Id. at 7-8.
Id
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Bird II, H&AS No. 84-69, at 2.
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HartfordAccident and disagreed that the assault arose out of Officer
Bird's employment 90 :
For the work to "create the relations and conditions which resulted in
the clash", [sic] I think that Hartford Accident at a minimum requires:
1) a showing that the employment required the combatants to work in
an environment which brings them together often enough for their
temperaments and emotions to interact under strains of the workplace
and which tends to increase the likelihood of friction between them;
and 2) a finding that the injured employee was not the aggressor.91
The Director went on to explain why Officer Bird was not entitled
to benefits pursuant to this test:
In Hartford Accident there were two environmental factors which
tended to increase the likelihood of friction between the fight
participants. First, there existed a supervisor-supervisee relationship
between the fight participants. Disputes will often develop within such
relationships based on the different notions of how, how fast, how well
or how carefully a particular task should have been, was, or should be
performed. In many instances, a supervisor's performance rating
depends upon the performances of his supervisees. Pressures on the
supervisees from supervisors sometimes erupt into violence or heated
verbal exchanges.
Second, the nature of the duties of the claimant, a grocery helper,
and the supervisor, a checker, assured that they would come into
contact regularly. Thus, the more opportunities which arose for
their temperaments and emotions to cross paths, the greater the
likelihood of friction.
In this proceeding Claimant was a security guard principally
stationed near the main receptionist area inside of a World Bank
building. The parking garage attendant worked outside and under that
building. Claimant and the parking attendant would have occasion to
see each other on the parking area when Claimant arrived at work or
when he was on patrol and sometimes in the locker room when
Claimant changed clothes.
Although Claimant's occasional visits to the garage area to park or
remove his car or to perform a security function and his use of the
90.
91.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
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locker rooms might have brought him into contact with the parking
attendant, it cannot reasonably be concluded that the nature of their
respective duties or their employment relationship was likely to
increase friction. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that
Claimant was required to drive to work or to come to work in his street
clothes. While the World Bank may have permitted Claimant's use of
the locker rooms, that fact is insufficient to justify a conclusion that the
employment created the relations and conditions which resulted in the
clash. Indeed, if that were the case, any two employees who have
occasion to ride an employer's elevators together, to use the same
bathroom facilities or to see one another in the company cafeteria and
who engage in a personal fight, would sustain compensable injuries.
Hartford Accident, however, does not go so far.
At the end of Hartford Accident Judge Rutledge attempted to
reconcile his view with those expressed in Fazio by pointing out that
"claimant there was the aggressor in the physical assault." In
Ackerman, moreover, the Court once again noted that Hartford
Accident was limited to circumstances where the claimant was not the
aggressor. In light of those remarks, I must conclude that injuries
resulting from a fight with a co-worker are not compensable
under Hartford Accident unless the claimant is not the aggressor.
In this proceeding, the evidence tends to support the view that
Claimant was the aggressor. Regardless of who struck the first blow, it
was Claimant who first approached the parking attendant and who
seemed bent on settling a score.
I accept, moreover, the
[administrative law judge's] finding that claimant "challenged
Mohamed to go outside to fight." Based on these facts, I find Claimant
to have been the aggressor and that under Hartford Accident his
injuries did not arise out of his employment.
Because I find that Claimant's claim for benefits must be denied on
the grounds that his injuries did not arise out of his employment, I need
not reach the second issue of whether Claimant's intent to fight
constitutes a willful intent to injure another. 92
The statutory language from the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act that Justice Rutledge interpreted in
Hartford Accident is almost identical to the language in the Act. 93 In

92. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
93. Compare 33 U.S.C.A. § 903(c) (1996) (originally enacted as Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, 1426 (1927)) ("No compensation shall be
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Hartford Accident, the claimant's injuries from a work-related assault
were compensable:
Nor is it necessary, as these cases show, that the particular act or
event which is the immediate cause of the injury be itself part of any
work done for the employer by the claimant or others.
Otherwise no award could be given for many injuries now
compensated, such as those caused by stray bullets, unexplained falls,
objects falling from outside the employer's premises and work, many
street risks, horseplay, most assaults and many other causes. "The
risks of injury incurred in the crowded contacts of the factory through
the acts of fellow workmen are not measured by the tendency of such
acts to serve the master's business." Not that the act is in the line
of duty, or forwards the work, or creates special risk, but that the work
brings the employee within its peril makes it, for purposes of
compensation, "part of the work."
Recognition that this is so came more easily as to physical than as
to human forces. As with street risks, the early disposition in cases of
human action was to emphasize the particular act and its nature,
except anomalously when it involved merely negligence of the
claimant or fellow employees. The statutory abolition of common
law defenses made easy recognition of the accidental character of
negligent acts by the claimant and fellow servants. The extension
to their accidental (i.e., nonculpable, but injurious) behavior was not
difficult. So with that of strangers, including assault by deranged
persons, and their negligence
intruding into the working
environment. But these extensions required a shift in the emphasis
from the particular act and its tendency to forward the work to its part
as a factor in the general working environment. The shift involved
recognition that the environment includes associations as well as
conditions, and that associations include the faults and derelictions of
human beings as well as their virtues and obediences. Men do not
discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the job
they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and rectitude. Just as
inevitably they take along also their tendencies to carelessness and
camaraderie, as well as emotional make-up. In bringing men

&

payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the willful
intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another."), and Hartford Accident
Indem. Co., v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (quoting the exact
language from the Act of 1927), with D.C. CODE § 32-1503(d) (2001) ("Liability for
compensation shall not apply where injury to the employee was occasioned solely by his
intoxication or by his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another.").
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together, work brings these qualities together, causes frictions
between them, creates occasions for lapses into carelessness, and for
fun-making and emotional flare-up. Work could not go on if men
became automatons repressed in every natural expression. "Old Man
River" is a part of loading steamboats. These expressions of human
nature are incidents inseparable from working together. They involve
risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the working
environment.
But resistance to application of the broad and basic principle has
been most obstinate perhaps where the particular act immediately
causing injury involves responsible volition by the claimant or others.
The extreme instances are those containing an element of illegality or
criminality.
The horseplay and assault cases are illustrative.
Confusion and conflict still reign in these realms.
Several factors have sustained the resistance. One is the hangover
from common law conceptions of profiting by one's own wrong. But
this applies as well, in logic, to contributory or one's own
exclusive negligence. Another was the now thoroughly dissipated
notion that voluntary responsible action cannot be accidental. The
volitional character of the act also raised a supposed analogy to
"independent, intervening agency" in tort causation. There was,
further, an assumed essential opposition between "personal" acts and
those of an "official" (i.e., related to the work) character. An assault
necessarily involves emotional make-up and disturbance. In a broad
sense nothing is more personal. Quarreling is always so. This
accounts for the early disposition to regard all injuries from wilful
assault as not compensable, a view also necessarily dictated, except
rarely when duty requires fighting, if tendency of the particular act to
forward the work or direct connection with line of duty are the tests
of liability.
But that view now is repudiated universally in
recognition that work causes quarrels and fights.
That they
involve volition and fault, have no tendency to forward the work, and
are permeated with the personal element of anger no longer suffices
to break the causal connection between work and injury. Emotional
disturbance is not of itself an "independent, intervening cause" or a
"departure from the work."
But differences remain as to when work causes quarrels. So long as
the claimant is merely the victim, not a participant, it makes
little difference whether the fighting is by fellow employees or
strangers to the work or what is the immediate occasion for the dispute.
The same is true in horseplay. It is sufficient that the work brings the
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claimant within the range of peril by requiring his presence there
when it strikes. But conflict becomes acute when the claimant
participates. There are two lines of division, which partially overlap.
One is concerned with whether the claimant is the aggressor. Another
turns on whether the dispute arises immediately over the work or
about something else. One view limits compensable causation to
quarrels relating directly to the work.
It
disconnects
the
precipitating incident from the working environment, though that
alone may have produced it. So isolated, its immediate relevance to
the work becomes the [determining] consideration. Momentary lapses
from duty, as in horseplay, kidding and teasing, which often explode
into bursts of temper and fighting become "departures from the
work," "independent, intervening causes" or "purely personal
matters." Their immediate irrelevance overcomes and nullifies the part
played by the work in bringing the men together and creating the
occasion for the lapse or outburst. The other view rejects the test of
immediate relevancy of the culminating incident. That is
regarded, not as an isolated event, but as part and parcel of the
working environment, whether related directly to the job or to
something which is a by-product of the association. This view
recognizes that work places men under strains and fatigue from
human and mechanical impacts, creating frictions which explode in
myriads of ways, only some of which are immediately relevant to
their tasks. Personal animosities are created by working together on
the assembly line or in traffic. Others initiated outside the job are
magnified to the breaking point by its compelled contacts. No worker
is immune to these pressures and impacts upon temperament. They
accumulate and explode over incidents trivial and important, personal
and official. But the explosion point is merely the culmination
of the antecedent pressures. That it is not relevant to the
immediate task, involves a lapse from duty, or contains an element of
volition or illegality does not disconnect it from them nor nullify
their causal effect in producing its injurious consequences. Any
other view would reintroduce the conceptions of contributory fault,
action in the line of duty, nonaccidental character of voluntary
conduct, and independent, intervening cause as applied in tort law,
which it was the purpose of the statute to discard. It would require
the application of different basic tests of liability for injuries caused
by volitional conduct of the claimant and those resulting from
negligent action, mechanical causes and the volitional activities of
others.
The limitation, of course, is that the accumulated pressures must be
attributable in substantial part to the working environment. This
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implies that their causal effect shall not be overpowered and
nullified
by influences originating entirely outside the working
relation and not substantially magnified by it.
Whether such
influences have annulling effect upon those of the environment
ordinarily is the crucial issue. The difference generally is as to the
applicable standard. It is not, as is frequently assumed, the law of
"independent, intervening agency" applied in tort cases. It cannot be
prescribed in meticulous detail, but is set forth in the statute, not
only in the broad presumptions created in favor of compensability,
but more explicitly in the provision by which Congress has expressed
clearly its intention concerning the kinds of acts which bar recovery
when done by the claimant. The provision is: "No compensation shall
be payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of
the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or
kill himselfor another."
This provision, reinforced by the statutory presumptions and the
Act's fundamental policy in departing from fault as the basis of
liability and of defense, except as specified, is inconsistent with
any notion that recovery is barred by misconduct which amounts to
no more than temporary lapse from duty, conduct immediately
irrelevant to the job, contributory negligence, fault, illegality, etc.,
unless it amounts to the kind and degree of misconduct prescribed in
definite terms by the Act. It is entirely inconsistent with reading
into the statute the law of tort causation and defense, where liability is
predicated on fault and nullified by contributory fault. We are
committed by the statutes and our previous decisions against the test
of immediate relevancy of the precipitating act to the task in hand. 94

'

Regretfully, Justice Rutledge went on to note, "Claimant may
have been at fault, but he was the aggressor neither in the banter nor
in the physical encounter[,]" and he did distinguish Fazio on the
grounds that "claimant there was the aggressor in the physical
assault."9
Based upon his narrow reading of HartfordAccident, the Director
adopted a two-prong test to determine the compensability of injuries
sustained during a fight at work; despite a connection between
employment conditions and the fight, so long as the claimant was
the aggressor, the claimant's injuries are beyond the scope of
employment and are not compensable. To understand why the Bird
94.
95.
96.

HartfordAccident, 112 F.2d at 14-17 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 18.
BirdII, H&AS No. 84-96, at 7.
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test goes against basic principles of workers' compensation law in the
District of Columbia requires an understanding of those principles
including no-fault liability, the presumption of compensability, arising
out of and in the course of employment, positional risk, and willful
misconduct and willful intention to injure.97

III. FUNDAMENTALS OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION

A. No-Fault Liability
Private-sector employers in the District of Columbia are subject to
the Act, and in exchange for limits on employers' economic burdens,
claimants receive a practical and expeditious process for resolving
issues about compensation for on-the-job accidents.98
Workers'
compensation adjudication is not synonymous with tort litigation, and
there are important distinctions between the two systems; "[i]n tort law
the beginning point is always a person's act, and the act causes certain
consequences. In worker[s'] compensation law the beginning point is
not an act at all; it is a relation or condition or situation-namely,
employment." 99
With the focus on the employment relationship, neither
negligence nor fault is supposed to be a bar to recovery."co
97. See infra pp. 25-38.
98. Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658, 660-61 (D.C. 1979). See also D.C. Code § 32-1504
(2001) of the Act:
(a) The liability of an employer prescribed in §32-1503 shall be exclusive and in place of
all liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, spouse or
domestic partner, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law on account of such injury or death.
(b) The compensation to which an employee is entitled under this chapter shall constitute
the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer, or any collective- bargaining
agent of the employer's employees and any employee, officer, director, or agent of such
employer, insurer, or collective-bargaining agent (while acting within the scope of his
employment) for any illness, injury, or death arising out of and in the course of his
employment; provided, that if an employer fails to secure payment of
compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee, or his legal
representative in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation
under this chapter, or to maintain an action at law for damages on account of such injury
or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that injury was caused
by the negligence of a fellow servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his
employment, nor that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee.
99. 1 Arthur Larson, et al., CHAPTER 3 THE FIVE LINES OF INTERPRETATIONS OF
"ARISING ", in Larson's Workers' compensation Law § 3.06 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2014).
100. 1 Arthur Larson, et al., CHAPTER 1 THE NA TURE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION,
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Nonetheless,
[t]he most familiar and persistent effect [of applying the tortconnection fallacy] is the difficulty lawyers and judges feel in
reconciling themselves to the notion that the employee's misconduct
causing his or her own injury must really be altogether disregarded. So,
in various forms such as added- risk doctrines, and in various
troublesome categories, such as assault and horseplay cases, fault
concepts have at times crept into compensation decisions. 101
When the focus shifts from the employment relationship to the
claimant's misbehavior, the tort-based concept of fault inappropriately
affects resolution of the claim.
B. The Presumption of Compensability
Private-sector claimants also receive the benefit of the very
foundation of the Act-the presumption of compensability.1 0 2
Pursuant to section 32-1521(1) of the Act, there is a rebuttable
presumption that an accidental injury arises out of and in the
course of employment thereby entitling the claimant to medical benefits
and wage loss benefits: "[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a
claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary: (1) [t]hat the claim comes within
the provisions of this chapter."' 0 3 In order to benefit from the
presumption of compensability, the claimant initially must show some
evidence of a disability and the existence of a work-related event,
activity, or requirement which has the potential to cause or to
contribute to the disability.1 0 4
Once the presumption of compensability has been invoked, the
burden shifts to the employer to come forth with substantial
evidence "specific and comprehensive enough to sever the potential
connection between a particular injury and a job-related event;",os in
in Larson's Workers' compensation Law § 1.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2014).
101. Id. § 1.02.
102. § 32-1521.
103. Id.
104. Ferreira v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C. 1987); Wash. Hosp.
Ctr. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 744 A.2d 992, 996 (D.C. 2000) ("[O]nce an employee
offers evidence demonstrating that an injury was potentially caused or aggravated by workrelated activity, a presumption arises that the injury is work-related and therefore compensable
under the Act.").
105. Waugh v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 786 A.2d 595, 600 (D.C. 2001) (citation omitted).
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the absence of evidence to the contrary, a claim is deemed to come
within the provisions of the Act. 10 6 On the other hand, if the employer
successfully rebuts the presumption of compensability, the burden
returns to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
(without the benefit of the presumption of compensability) the disability
arose out of and in the course of employment. 07
The thresholds for invoking and for rebutting the presumption of
compensability are low. 0 8 Frequently, application of the presumption of
compensability is the starting point for analyzing a claim for benefits,' 09
but application of the presumption of compensability lacks consistency.
C. Arising Out of and in the Course ofEmployment
The presumption of compensability applies to the issue of whether
an injury arises out of and in the course of employment thereby making
any resulting disability compensable." 0 Section 32-1501(12) of the Act
defines "injury" as

"

an accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of
employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises
naturally out of such employment or as naturally or unavoidably
results from such accidental injury, and includes an injury caused
by the willful act of third persons directed against an employee
because of his employment.
"[Tihere is no requirement of an unusual occurrence[;] to show that
he or she suffered an 'accidental injury' a [claimant] need prove only
that something unexpectedly went wrong within the human frame,"ll 2
but in order to be compensable, an injury must arise out of and in the
course of employment." 3
"Arising out of" and "in the course of' are two distinct
elements of every workers' compensation claim although proof of

106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 599.
109. Id.
110. Waugh, 786 A.2d at 599.
111. D.C. CODE § 32-1501(12) (2001).
112. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 506 A.2d 1127, 1128
(D.C. 1986).
113. § 32-1501(12); Grayson v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 516 A.2d 909, 911 (D.C.
1986).
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one may incidentally establish the other.1 14 "Arising out of' refers to
"the origin or cause of the injury;" an accident occurs "in the
course of employment" when it takes "place within the period of
employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be
expected to be, and while he [or she] is reasonably fulfilling duties
of his [or her] employment or doing something reasonably incidental
thereto."' 15
"In the course of' refers to "the time, place and circumstances
under which the injury occurred;"ll 6
the "in the course of' requirement may be satisfied where an injury
occurs "in the performance of an activity related to employment,
which may include . . an activity of mutual benefit to employer and
employee." Under Kolson, what counts for the purposes of the "in the
course of' analysis is whether the activity at issue "relate[s] to [one's]
employment." That an activity is beneficial to both the employer and
the employee may, but does not necessarily, illustrate that relation.117
Furthermore, when assessing "arising out of and in the course
of employment," a quantum approach applies:
That approach to analysis of "arising out of and occurring in the
course of employment" questions derives from Larson's Workers'
Compensation Law, §29.01 (2000 Ed.) (Larson's), which includes the
following:
The discussion [in the treatise] of the coverage formula, "arising
out of and in the course of employment", was opened with the
suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put under
separate headings [in the treatise] for convenience, some interplay
between the two factors would be observed in various
categories

discussed.

. .

. [T]he two tests, in practice, have not

been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent
merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost
tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of workconnection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection
must be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the
arising quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the
necessary minimum, as it will also when the arising quantity is
114.

Kolson v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 699 A.2d 357, 359-60 (D.C. 1997).

115.

Id. at 361.

116.
117.

Id.
Bentt v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 979 A.2d 1226, 1235 (D.C. 2009) (citation omitted).
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very small but the "course" quantity is relatively large.
But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the
minimum quantum will not be met.118
If an injury does not arise out of employment or does not occur in the
course of employment, it is not compensable.119
D. Positional Risk
When evaluating whether an injury "arises out of' employment,
there are three possible origins of that injury: "[(1)] risks distinctly
associated with the employment, [(2)] risks personal to the claimant, and
[(3)] 'neutral' risks-i.e., risks having no particular employment or
personal character." 1 2 0
Risks associated with employment universally are compensable;
risks personal to the claimant universally are not compensable.12 1 The
positional risk test determines the compensability of neutral risks:
"Under the positional-risk test, an injury arises out of employment so
long as it would not have happened but for the fact that conditions and
obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where
she was injured."1 2 2
Furthermore, this test is to be construed liberally to further the
principles underlying workers' compensation: "Fault has nothing to do
with whether or not compensation is payable. The economic impact on
an injured workman and his family, is the same whether the injury was
caused by the employer's fault or otherwise." 2 3 In the end, the
positional-risk test removes any requirement of "a causal relationship
between the nature of the employment and the risk of injury. Nor need
the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of benefit to
the employer."1 2 4

118.

Lewis, 2006 WL 850906, at *2 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Serys. Feb. 16. 2006) (footnotes

omitted) (quoting 2 ARTHUR LARSON ET AL., Chapter 29 Conclusion: Work-Connection as Merger
of "Arising" and "Course", in LARSON's WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 29.01 (Matthew

Bender & Co. ed., 2014)).
119. See Lewis, 2006 WL 850906, at *1.
120. Bentt, 979 A.2d at 1232.
121. Id.
122. Id; Georgetown Univ. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 830 A.2d 865, 872 (D.C.
2003).
123. See Grayson v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Sers., 516 A.2d 909, 912 (App. D.C. 1986)
(quoting Whetro v. Awkerman, 174 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Mich. 1970)).
124. Clark v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Sers., 743 A.2d 722, 727 (D.C. 2000) (citations omitted.)
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The concept of positional-risk frequently applies when
assessing the compensability of assaults in the workplace. 12 5 For
example, Ms. Janet Clark's claim for workers' compensation benefits
was denied because an administrative law judge ruled Ms. Clark's
injuries did not arise out of her employment as a dialysis technician
with BMA Capitol Hill;1 2 6 an unknown assailant in BMA Capitol
Hill's parking lot shot Ms. Clark for unknown reasons. 12 7 The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the denial of benefits because
BMA Capitol Hill had not presented sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of compensability.1 28
The sole issue presented at the formal hearing was whether the
assault arose out of and in the course of Ms. Clark's employment.1 29
Ms. Clark's presence in her employer's parking lot was sufficient to
invoke the presumption of compensability, and the burden shifted to
BMA Capitol Hill to rebut the presumption; 3 0 however, the
administrative law judge reasoned that because Ms. Clark's assailant
had targeted her as the owner of a particular automobile in the parking
lot and had said something prior to the attack that "may reasonably be
construed to denote a relationship predicated upon factors other than
claimant's position as a dialysis technician with employer," BMA
Capitol Hill had rebutted the presumption of compensability. "' When
weighing the evidence, the administrative law judge ruled Ms. Clark
"had failed to produce any evidence affirmatively linking the motive
behind the assault to her employment [and had failed to] establish any
connection between the geographic location of her employment and the
assault." 3 2 Ms. Clark's claim for benefits was denied.1 33
The Director affirmed the denial by noting that there was
substantial evidence in the record for the administrative law judge to
conclude that "this was not a random act of violence, and that it was
targeted specifically to the owner of the red car, namely the claimant." 1 3 4
Therefore, the Director found that there was substantial evidence in the

125. See id
126. Id at 726.
127. Id at 724.
128. Id. at 729-31.
129. Id. at 725.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 726. (quoting Clark, 1994 LEXIS 200, at *8 (D.C. Dept' of Empt' Servs. Mar.
24, 1994)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 726.
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record for the administrative law judge to find that claimant's injury did
not arise out of her employment.135
Ms. Clark filed an appeal with the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.1 36 With the motive for the assault unknown, the finding that
Ms. Clark's "assailant had some motive to target her specifically is not
the same as a finding that he had a personal, non-work related motive to
do so."'

Analyzing the positional-risk test in conjunction with the

presumption of compensability, the Court noted that
[p]ursuant to the positional-risk test, an injury arises out of
employment so long as it would not have happened but for the fact that
conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in a
position where he was injured. "This theory supports compensation,
for example, in cases of stray bullets, roving lunatics, and other
situations in which the only connection of the employment with the
injury is that its obligations placed the employee in the particular place
at the particular time when he or she was injured by some neutral
force, meaning by 'neutral' neither personal to the claimant nor
distinctly associated with the employment." On the other hand, "when
it is clear that the employment contributed nothing to the episode,
whether by engendering or exacerbating the quarrel or facilitating the
assault, the assault should be held noncompensable even in states fully
accepting the positional risk test, since that test applies only when the
risk is 'neutral."' 3 8
[A]nd that
where an employee is assaulted by a third party on the
135. Id.
136. See Id at 724.
137. Id. at 730; cf Smith, 1997 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 564, at *16 (Dep't of Emp't Servs.
Aug. 14, 1997).
[Ricky Hugee] had come onto employer's premises in order to obtain some of the money
which he believed, rightly or wrongly, claimant had borrowed from him in 1994. The
physical confrontation in which the two individuals became involved was purely
personal in nature and in no way founded upon the premise that employer or anyone else
other than claimant was the object of Hugee's inquiry. Hugee, upon hearing claimant
had no money which he could borrow, despite having been told by claimant he might
obtain some of the money if he would stop by the store on a pay day, expressed outward
displeasure at claimant for appearing to have deceived him. Although the identity of the
aggressor is unclear on the record, the inescapable conclusion is that claimant's fractured
left ankle occurred due to a matter unrelated to claimant's duties and responsibilities as a
meat cutter.

Smith, 1997 D.C. Wrk. Comp. Lexis 564, at *16.
138. Clark, 743 A.2d at 727 (citations omitted).
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employer's premises or otherwise in the course of employment, the
employee's resulting injuries are presumed covered under the
Workers' Compensation Act unless the employer presents substantial
evidence that the assault was motivated by something entirely personal
to the employee and unrelated to the employment. For this reason,
even if the assault remains unexplained, it is compensable under the
Act. This policy comports with the humanitarian purpose of the
Workers' Compensation Act; it results in compensation for those
employees assaulted at work who simply do not know or cannot prove
the motive behind the assault. 139
E. Willful Misconduct and Willful Intention to Injure
Even if an injury does arise out of and in the course of
employment, some jurisdictions bar recovery of workers' compensation
benefits when a claimant engages in willful misconduct.1 40 In those
jurisdictions, willful misconduct may mean violating a rule or a statute
4 1
in a way that takes the claimant outside the scope of employment.1
In the District of Columbia, however, "the Act exempts from liability
neither injuries where the employee is injured while willfully violating
an employer's rules nor injuries where the employee is injured by
gross neglect of his duties"; 14 2 recovery is barred only when a
claimant's misconduct is part of an intentional plan or attempt to injure
oneself or another.1 43
The Act specifically states that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it shall be presumed an injury was not occasioned by a
claimant's willful intention to injure oneself or another,'" but the Act
does not define "willful intention." 4 5 In this absence of a statutory
definition, "two factors have figured in the cases interpreting the
'willful intent to injure' exception: 'the factor of seriousness of the
claimant's initial assault, and the factor of premeditation as against

139. Id. at 728 (citation omitted). Ultimately, so long as employment conditions exposed the
claimant to the risk or danger connected with the accident, the resulting injury is compensable. See
D.C. Code § 32-1501(12) (2001).
140. See Jones, 1991 WL 11003994 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. Feb. 20, 1991).
141. Id. at *4.
142. Mooney, 1997 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 433, at *5-7, *19 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.,
Dec. 23, 1997).
143. Whitesides, 2007 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 389, at *9 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., Oct.
4, 2007).
144. § 32-1521(4).
145. § 32-1501.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol32/iss1/4

26

Jones: Injecting Fault into a No-Fault System: The Aggressor Defense in
THE AGGRESSOR DEFENSE

2014]1

impulsiveness."

117

46

Importantly, this defense is not defined by the results of the
conduct. For example, Mr. Kenneth Skeen worked as a floorman in a
gentleman's club.1 4 7 When he saw a patron in the club clicking the
trigger of a pistol, he charged that patron, and the patron shot him.1 4 8
The patron ran out of the club, and Mr. Skeen followed.1 49 In a
nearby alley between two houses, the patron shot Mr. Skeen twice
more." 0 In response, Mr. Skeen hit the patron with a pipe he had found
during the chase.'s'
At a formal hearing, Mr. Skeen's employer conceded that Mr.
Skeen may not have demonstrated an intent to injure the patron by
pursuing that patron, but it argued that by continuing to pursue the
patron and by grabbing a piece of pipe, Mr. Skeen had demonstrated a
willful intention to injure the patron.152 An administrative law judge
disagreed:
Employer's argument is unpersuasive. I find that claimant's
actions in pursuing the [patron] were spontaneous and amount to an
impulsive and instinctive reaction to the [patron's] act of pointing a
gun at claimant and pulling the trigger.
Claimant was a very candid witness. I find his testimony both
reliable and credible. Thus, I find credible claimant's testimony that
less than a minute elapsed between the time the [patron] pointed the
gun at claimant and pulled the trigger in the hallway and the time
claimant was shot in the alley between the two houses. I find it
inconceivable that claimant's behavior during this brief period of time
manifested a premeditated intent to injure the [patron].
In addition, I find credible claimant's testimony that claimant
found the piece of pipe between the two houses after he was shot by
the [patron] and that he did not have the pipe in his hand when he left
the bar. Thus, there is no credible evidence which establishes that
claimant used any threatening language or gestures indicative of
willful intent.
146.
omitted).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Skeen, 1983 WL 482640, at *4 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., Aug. 30, 1983) (citation
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2-3.
Id at *3.
Id.
Id at *4.
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Regarding the factor of seriousness of the initial assault, claimant
argues that he did not make the initial assault, and did not hit the
[patron] until he already had been shot. Employer argues that
claimant's attack on the [patron] is of such seriousness that it manifests
a willful intent to injure the [patron].
Employer's argument concerning this factor is also unpersuasive. I
find credible claimant's testimony that he did not hit the [patron] until
after he had been shot. Thus, the only initial assault claimant made
was, while unarmed, charging at an armed man. I find it inconceivable
that claimant's charging at the armed [patron] was of such seriousness
that it manifests a willful intent to injure the [patron]. Indeed, in the
cases cited by Professor Larson where the "willful intent to injure"
defense was successfully invoked, the initial assault was considerably
more serious than in the instant case.153

The standard for proving willful intention to injure is high,
especially in conjunction with the statutory presumption against the
applicability of this defense. An intent to injure another requires
premeditation or deliberation; it requires more than a reaction which
leads to an injury, even a serious injury.1 5 4 As a result, the defense of

willful intention does not often succeed in the District of Columbia
and is not equivalent to acting with hostility or aggression; therefore,
it is not the equivalent of a statutory aggressor defense.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE AGGRESSOR DEFENSE: AGGRESSOR VS.
PROVOCATEUR
Given that there is no statutory aggressor defense in the District
of Columbia, it should come as no surprise that there is no
statutory or regulatory definition of an aggressor in this context.
One administrative law judge defined "aggressor" by stating
"overbearing physical retaliation, which may not be warranted by the
initial assault, does not equate to aggression. The aggressor is the
individual who instigates the physical confrontation, not necessarily the
one most damaged in its aftermath."15 5 The application of the Bird
test has gone beyond denying benefits only to the worker who threw
the first punch.15 6

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at *4-5 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
Id. at *4.
Sims, 2003 WL 23303752, at *6 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. Sept.-24, 2003).
Mansaray, 2002 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 8, at *16 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. Jan. 25,
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Mr. Sulaiman Mansaray was employed by the Grand Hyatt Hotel
Washington as a dishwasher.15'
Mr. Mansaray regularly worked with
other dishwashers supplied to the hotel by a temporary employment
agency. 158
Mr. Mansaray had a habit of treating the temporary workers with
rudeness and contempt, and on December 29, 2000, Mr. Mansaray
directed numerous disparaging comments toward Mr. Ramon
Adams.1 5 9 Mr. Mansaray was admonished to stop treating his coworkers with disrespect, but he persisted. 6 0
In response to Mr. Mansaray's comments, Mr. Adams twice
approached Mr. Mansaray in a manner that gave the appearance that he
was going to strike Mr. Mansaray.1 6 ' Both times, Mr. Adams was
restrained and was removed from the situation.' 62
Late in the evening, Mr. Adams was sorting glassware when Mr.
Mansaray interrupted Mr. Adams' work by stacking a rack of coffee
cups on top of the glassware Mr. Adams was sorting.1 63 Mr. Adams
demanded Mr. Mansaray remove the coffee cups; Mr. Mansaray
refused, and Mr. Adams threw the rack to the floor.1 64 At this point, for
the third time that night, Mr. Mansaray made disparaging comments
about Mr. Adams.1 65
Mr. Adams approached Mr. Mansaray quickly, but Mr. Mansaray
retreated to an adjacent hallway.1 66 When Mr. Adams caught up to Mr.
Mansaray, he beat him about the head and face.1 67 An administrative
law judge found Mr. Mansaray, "instigated the fight by provoking Mr.
Adams with insults and taunts which had previously caused Mr. Adams
to respond in a fashion that was potentially violent and which could
reasonably have been expected to cause a normal person of average
sensibilities to react with violence." 68
There was no dispute that Mr. Mansaray had not struck the first

2002).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *6-7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7-8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
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blow. 169
His pattern of conduct, however, had "the potential to
provoke a person of average sensibilities to respond with violence, a
variant of the 'fighting words' concept," and his continued taunting
even after Mr. Adams twice had been on the verge of violence "put
him on notice that his conduct was capable of and perhaps even likely
to lead to an altercation in which he might sustain injury."'The
administrative law judge concluded Mr. Mansaray's injuries were
not compensable:
[C]laimant engaged in a course and pattern of abusive, insulting, and
intentionally offensive and knowingly provocative behavior,
repeatedly and in the face of employer workplace rules prohibiting
such conduct and a specific admonition from his direct supervisor on
the night in question to desist therefrom, and was therefore an
"aggressor" whose claim for compensation is barred. Where the
misconduct of the claimant reaches the point where an average person
of normal sensibilities could be expected to respond with violence,
and where that misconduct has been shown through the
relationship and behavioral response of a particular individual to pose
a significant likelihood that continuing in that course of
misconduct will lead to a violent response, and where that misconduct
is not significantly useful or necessary to the employer, and is in fact
prohibited by the employer, the misconduct can be considered to
establish that the claimant is an "aggressor" whose injuries resulting
from the response to the misconduct are not compensable under the
Act.17

1

Pursuant to Mansaray, a claimant who did not throw the first
punch still qualifies as the aggressor if his actions provoke an average
person of normal sensibilities to strike. This case hints at the practical
difficulties Larson envisioned and the Montana Workers' Compensation
Court acknowledged in Kuykendall v. Liberty Northwest:
Contrary to Liberty's argument, the Montana Supreme Court has
not held that the aggressor is automatically precluded from receiving
workers' compensation benefits. Only a minority of jurisdictions
continue to allow the aggressor defense as an absolute bar to
recovery. Larson explains the practical difficulties in applying the
aggressor defense as follows:

170.

Id. at *16.
Id. at * 16-17.

171.

Id at * 19-20 (footnote omitted).

169.
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[L]ong after a quarrel is over, it is often almost impossible to

determine who really started it. Many a parent [has] been forced
to sit in belated judgment on this issue between two children, the
testimony consisting of 'He hit me'; 'Yes, but she called me a
stinker'; 'But before that he grabbed my book'; and so on. One
cannot read the facts behind the aggressor cases without seeing
how closely the average factory scuffle follows this pattern.

The test for course of employment is not based on whether
claimant was the initial aggressor, which he was not, or on
whether he escalated the situation such that the roles were switched
and he then became the aggressor. Rather, as stated in Pinyerd, the
test is whether there was a "reasonable connection between" the
fight and claimant's resulting injury "and the conditions under
which he [the claimant] pursued his employment." The connection
exists in this case. "It is universally agreed that if the assault grew
out of an argument over the performance of the work, the
possession of the tools 72or equipment used in the work,. . . the
assault is compensable."'1
Unlike the District of Columbia, however, Montana rejects the aggressor
defense. 73
V. THE BIRD TEST AND...

A. No-FaultLiability
Each of these topics thus far plays an important role in the workers'
compensation system. Applying the Bird test in the context of each one
demonstrates the problems inherent in accepting the aggressor defense.
As noted previously, in exchange for limits on employers'
economic burdens, the workers' compensation system was established
to give claimants a practical and expeditious remedy for resolving
issues delaying compensation for on-the-job injuries.' 7 4 So long as the
claimant was injured "while acting within the scope of his
employment,"' 75 those issues are not intended to include fault; "[e]very
172.

Kuykendall, 1997 WL 148246, at *8-9 (Mont. Worker Comp. Ct., Mar. 17, 1997)

(citations omitted).

173.
174.
175.

Id. at *8.
Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658, 660 (D.C. 1979).
D.C. Code § 32-1504(b) (2001).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

31

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

122

[Vol. 32:91

employer subject to this chapter shall be liable for compensation for
injury or death without regard to fault as a cause of the injury or
death."1

76

Consistent with these concepts, the first prong of the Bird test
requires the claimant prove "the employment required the combatants to
work in an environment which brings them together often enough for
their temperaments and emotions to interact under strains of the
workplace and which tends to increase the likelihood of friction between
them."1 77

Satisfying this portion of the test brings the claimant's
aggressive activity within the scope of employment because
employment conditions created the frictions culminating in a fight;
personal animosities brought into the workplace are not compensable.178
Thus far, the Bird test merely restates the foundation for any
compensable workers' compensation claim.
The second prong of the Bird test, however, injects fault into a nofault system: "The injured employee was not the aggressor."l79
Regardless of the work-related origin of the altercation so long as "he
started it," the claimant's injuries summarily are not compensable, but
the claimant's role as the aggressor does not change the fact that the
fight was work-related.' 80
Colorado recognizes this important
consideration in its rejection of the aggressor defense:
Judicial recognition of an initial aggressor defense would be
inconsistent with the aims of the Workers' Compensation Act.

It

would introduce the common law concept of fault into a
comprehensive statutory scheme designed to allocate cost and
ensure compensation, not analyze culpability.

Such analysis of

'who threw the first punch' is contrary to quick and efficient
176. § 32-1503(b).
177. BirdII, H&AS No. 84-96, OWC No. 0015644, at 6 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. June 1,
1985).
178. See Pinto, 2000 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 212, at *1, *11-22, *76-77 (Dep't of Emp't
Servs. June 29, 2000); BirdII, H&AS No. 84-69, at 1, 3.
I find that the claimant's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment with
the employer as a banquet waitress. I further find that the evidence reflects
claimant's injuries arose from a work related incident and not from a personal dispute
between the combatants that was imported into the workplace and the claim is
therefore not barred and is compensable under the Act.
Pinto, 2000 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 212, at *21.
179. See discussion supra pp. 42-43; BirdIf H&AS No. 84-69, at 6.
180. See Bird II, H&AS No. 84-69, at 7; Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638, 648 (Colo.
1991).
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administration of disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Act
of Colorado does not expressly authorize a defense against an initial
aggressor in an altercation leading to an otherwise compensable injury.
In the absence of such express authorization, we decline to read an
initial aggressor defense into the statutory scheme. 181
The issues do not stop here.
B. The Presumption of Compensability
If the first prong of the Bird test requires an analysis of whether
the claimant's actions arise out of and in the course of employment, the
presumption of compensability is implicated,' 82 but the presumption of
compensability has been applied inconsistently in cases involving an
alleged claimant-aggressor.' 83 Sometimes the aggressor defense has
applied when invoking the presumption of compensability; in Smith, an
administrative law judge required the claimant not be the aggressor in
order to trigger the presumption of compensability: "Based on the record
testimony, and reports submitted herein, claimant has presented
evidence of the two basic facts required to invoke the presumption: an
injury and a work related activity that she did not instigate, which
potentially contributed to the injury."' 84
Sometimes the aggressor defense has applied when rebutting the
presumption of compensability; in Sims, the employer's defense that
the claimant was the aggressor was not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of compensability:
Although there is no question that the incident on October 24, 2002
was directly related to claimant's employment duties and
responsibilities, employer has adduced some evidence to support
its argument that claimant was the aggressor in this incident. There
is testimonial and contemporaneous documentary evidence to
indicate that claimant either assaulted, or restrained Shavae
inappropriately, such that the child had to be shielded and protected
from the teacher.
However, claimant's testimony of how the
incident occurred, and the incident reports which support her

181. TriadPaintingCo., 812 P.2d at 644-45 (footnote omitted).
182. See discussion supra pp. 42-43; Ferreira v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 531 A.2d 651,
655 (D.C. 1987); Sims, 2003 WL 23303752, *4 (Dep't of Emp't Servs. Sept. 24, 2003).
183. See, e.g., Smith, 2003 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 349, *1, 7-11 (Dep't of Emp't Serys.
Dec. 23, 2003); Sims, 2003 WL 23303752, at *5-6; Coates, 2001 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 283, *1,
*7-10 (Dep't of Emp't Servs. Jan. 25, 2001).
184. Smith, 2003 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 349, at *10.
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testimony, are the version of events which was officially accepted by
employer.
There is no documentary or testimonial evidence, other than
claimant's, to address the beginning of the altercation; it is clear,
however, that no one else witnessed the beginning of the scuffle
on October 24, 2002. The observations reflected in the incident
reports and testimony at hearing were made after claimant and
Shavae were actively engaged in combat. Since Ms. Washington
(who testified that she observed claimant swinging at a cowering
Shavae) did not see the beginning of the confrontation, claimant's
testimony, as to what initially occurred, is uncontradicted.
It is
noted that overbearing physical retaliation, which may not be
warranted by the initial assault, does not equate to aggression. The
aggressor is the individual who instigates the physical confrontation,
not necessarily the one most damaged in its aftermath.
Employer attempts to use the aggressor defense to defeat the
compensability of this claim.
In order to rebut the statutory
presumption of compensability, the evidence adduced by employer
has to meet the standard of being specific, credible and
comprehensive.
There is not substantial record evidence to support employer's
contention that claimant was the aggressor on October 24,
2002. Therefore, employer fails to rebut the presumption of
compensability; the October 24, 2002 incident, in which claimant
sustained several injuries, arose out of and in the course of her
employment. 185

Sometimes the presumption of compensability has not applied at all:
The evidence in this case consists of the testimony of the claimant
and the testimony of Mr. Cooper. Claimant testified that he arrived at
the employer's offices, went directly to the administrative area, and
advised Mr. Cooper of the pay dispute involving Flippo. He testified
initially that Mr. Cooper advised him that he would have to wait until

185. Sims, 2003 WL 23303752, at *6 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); Mansaray, 2002
D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 8, *1, *9-17 (Dep't of Emp't Servs. Jan 25. 2002). "[E]mployer's
evidence [that Mr. Mansaray was the aggressor] is sufficient to overcome the presumption invoked
by claimant's evidence. The evidence will therefore be considered without reference to the
presumption, and with claimant having the burden of establishing entitlement to compensation
under the Act, by a preponderance of the evidence." Mansaray, 2002 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 8, at
* 17 (citation omitted).
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Mr. Cooper was not busy to deal with the issue; later he changed that
testimony, and said that no such instruction was given. He testified
that the date of the incident was June 6, but after prodding by his
attorney, he changed the date to June 13. He testified initially that Mr.
Cooper did ask him to leave the office prior to the physical contact
between them, but he later denied any such request or order to
leave was given. While the claimant's testimony was in these and
other respects inconsistent, lacking in detail, confused, non-responsive
and vague, Mr. Cooper's was detailed, straightforward, consistent and
responsive. Mr. Cooper testified as is set forth in the Findings of Fact.
Further, while Mr. Cooper's version of events appears to make a
certain amount of sense, e.g., an angry and disgruntled worker
accosted his supervisor over an alleged pay dispute, the claimant's
version doesn't, e.g., a busy supervisor engaged in dispatching workers
to various sites makes an unprovoked assault on the claimant, who was
merely requesting assistance in a pay dispute.
Taking these matters into account, and further considering that
claimant's testimonial demeanor was hurried and at times
unconvincing, I accept employer's version of the event in preference to
claimant's. As such, claimant has failed to demonstrate that he was
not the aggressor, as he must do in order to prevail under the Bird test,
and the claim therefore must be denied. 186
Importantly, the presumption of compensability is invoked by a
minimal showing of "some evidence of the existence of two 'basic
facts': a death or disability and a work-related event, activity, or
requirement which has the potential of resulting in or contributing to the
death or disability,"l 8 7 and once invoked, a claimant is entitled to the
presumption that "the claim comes within the provisions of [the
Act]."'"
If the aggressor defense continues to apply, it must apply
uniformly. An altercation at work that satisfies the first prong of the
Bird test suffices to invoke the presumption of compensability because
satisfying that portion of the test requires the same proof that is required
to invoke the presumption of compensability.1 8 9
The aggressor defense is an affirmative one; therefore, if it is to act
as a bar to recovery at all, it should not apply until the rebuttal stage
of the presumption analysis, and then, the burden of proof should rest
with the employer. Until the defense is proven, the claimant is entitled
186.
187.
188.
189.

Coates, 2001 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS, at *7-10 (citation omitted).
Ferreira,531 A.2d at 655.
D.C. CODE § 32-1521(1) (2001); Ferreira,531 A.2d at 655.
See discussion suprapp. 42-43; Ferreira,531 A.2d at 655.
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to the benefit of the presumption that the injury arises out of and in the
course of employment.' 9 0 Failure to apply the presumption of
compensability when the first prong of the Bird test has been satisfied
circumvents the humanitarian purpose of the Act by minimizing (if not
eliminating) the employer's burden to present substantial evidence
"specific and comprehensive enough to sever the potential connection
between a particular injury and a job-related event."' Repeatedly
(and appropriately), the relationship between the event causing the
injury and employment must remain the focus.
C. Arising Out Of and In the Course ofEmployment
Considering the employment relationship, in Bird, the Director
concluded the claimant's injury did not arise out of his
employment.1 92 Since Bird, administrative law judges have utilized
"arising out of' or "in the course of' or both to deny benefits when the
claimant is the aggressor.
In Williams, the administrative law judge relied upon "arising out
of' to deny benefits:
Injuries resulting from a fight with a co-worker [are] not compensable
unless the claimant is not an aggressor.
Moreover, to be
compensable, the injury must arise both out of and in the course of
employment. Since claimant was the aggressor, his injuries cannot be
said to have arisen out of his employment. Therefore, claimant's
claim is not compensable.1 93

The administrative law judge in Coates relied upon "in the course
of' to deny benefits; "I find and conclude [the claimant-aggressor]
did not sustain an accidental injury in the course of his
employment." 9 4 The same administrative law judge who decided
Coates decided Wolford, and in Wolford, the administrative law judge
relied upon both "arising out of' and "in the course of' to deny benefits;
"I find and conclude [the claimant-aggressor] did not sustain an
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment."' 9 5
190. See §§ 32-1504(b), -1521(1).
191. Waugh v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 786 A.2d 595, 598, 600 (D.C. 2003).
192. Bird H, H&AS No. 84-96, at 6.
193. Williams, 1987 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 100, at *9 (Dep't of Emp't Servs. Dec. 10,
1987) (citation omitted).
194. Coates, 2001 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 283, at *9-10.
195. Wolford, 2001 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 222, at 15 (Dep't of Emp't Servs. Nov. 21,
2001).
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Admittedly, there are times when a claimant's "fault" may sever
the connection between employment and disability. By statute, failure
to attend an independent medical examination
or
failure
to
cooperate with vocational rehabilitation may result in suspension
of benefits:
If at any time during such period the employee unreasonably
refuses to submit to medical or surgical treatment or to an
examination by a physician selected by the employer, or to accept
vocational rehabilitation the Mayor shall, by order, suspend the
payment of further compensation [and] medical payments ...

during

such period, unless the circumstances justified the refusal. 196
Such failures may be cured so benefits can be reinstated, but in other
instances the claimant's "fault" terminates entitlement to wage loss
benefits. For example, Mr. Frank Robinson was injured while
working for Flippo Construction Company.1 9 7 Following a short
absence, Mr. Robinson returned to work for Flippo in a light-duty
position at his pre-injury wage.' 98
After approximately two months in the light-duty position, Mr.
Robinson was terminated for violating Flippo's attendance rules.' 99
For approximately six months, Mr. Robinson could not find new
employment so he filed a claim for temporary total disability
benefits for that closed period of unemployment, but Mr. Robinson
was not entitled to wage loss benefits. 20 0 Because he had not suffered
any wage loss during his light- duty assignment, Mr. Robinson's posttermination wage loss was not attributable to his compensable injury. 201
The severance of the employment from the disability is
understandable under these circumstances. The wage loss resulting
from the termination for failure to comply with attendance rules does
not arise out of or in the course of employment because it is unrelated
to the on-the-job accident or the compensable injury, but there is a fine
distinction between fault that does sever the work-connection and fault
that does not:
In the present case, the primary contentions of the petitioner rest on
196. D.C. Code § 32-1507(d) (2001).
197. Robinson v. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 824 A.2d. 962, 963 (D.C. 2003).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 964-65.
201. Id.
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questions of law. First, Upchurch[, the claimant,] argues that the
Director relied on an incorrect legal standard by affirming the
[administrative law judge's] finding of no compensable wage loss
"because [Upchurch] was fired from his job for reasons not related to
the work injury." If read as urged by the petitioner, the Director's
decision would clearly rest on a misstatement of the law. This court
can find no authority, from any jurisdiction or legal treatise, which
would support the proposition that termination severs the causal
link between injury and wage loss. To the contrary, according to one
of the leading authorities on workers' compensation law, the
"[m]isconduct of the employee, whether negligent or wilful, is
immaterial in compensation law, unless it takes the form of deviation
from the course of employment, or unless it is of a kind specifically
made a defense in the jurisdictions containing such a defense in their
statutes." If the Director did indeed consider the termination of the
petitioner as a basis in law for denying benefits, such a
determination would not withstand judicial scrutiny as it would find
no support in the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act.
Specifically, the Act does not provide that the subsequent termination
of an employee, whether related or unrelated to a work injury, is a
defense for an employer who denies an obligation to pay disability
compensation. Rather, the Act creates a presumption that an
employee's injury is compensable upon a showing by substantial
evidence of a disability and a work-related event which had the
potential to cause such a disability.
The [employer, The Washington Post,] does not contend that the
law is otherwise, but argues for a different interpretation of the
language in the Director's decision. Under this interpretation, the
Director did not consider Upchurch's termination as a basis in law for
denying him disability benefits, but rather the Director agreed with
the [administrative law judge] that the petitioner had no wage loss
directly resulting from the work injury which would entitle him to
disability, and was simply further describing that petitioner had been
fired from his job. This interpretation would render the decision
legally valid, if supported by substantial evidence. Disability is an
economic and not a medical concept, and any injury that does not
result in loss of wage-earning capacity cannot be the foundation for a
finding of disability....
It is possible that the Director's decision may have been intended to
refer to the [administrative law judge's] conclusion that "any
wage loss claimant has incurred since January 26, 1998, is the
result of [the claimant's] personal choices including his failure to
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keep employer informed of his 'on-call' status, and to attend school
and not the result of a work injury." Nevertheless, the textual language
of the Director's decision is ambiguous and potentially legally
erroneous. One reading would render his decision reversible, as it
would be based on an incorrect legal standard, and another would
justify its validity.202
Even though certain forms of culpable behavior statutorily may
remove a claimant's actions from the scope of employment, by its very
terms, the first prong of the Bird test requires the employment bring the
combatants together "often enough for their temperaments and emotions
to interact under strains of the workplace . .. which tends to increase the
likelihood of friction between them." 2 03 Such a showing encompasses
only a fight that arises out of and in the course of employment even
though there may be little, if any, connection to the furtherance of the
employer's business or the performance of actual job duties. It is
more than a coincidence that the fight started at work; it started at work
because of strains and frictions caused by the conditions of employment,
and
[i]t is the character and nature of the assault which determines whether
it arises out of the employment, not the culpability or lack of
culpability or the parties involved. It is the assault itself which
arises out of the employment; and who initiates the altercation has no
bearing on that question, [the character and nature of the assault
itself is what] relates to common law culpability considerations. 204
In the end, who started the fight does not affect whether it is an
incident of employment.205 In other words, if a fight arises out of and
in the course of employment, it does so for both the aggressor and the
victim:
As stated in 4 NACCA Law Journal 53: "Where the assault is
directly connected with the work, and arises out of work-quarrels, as
distinguished from personal quarrels, the assault is compensable
without determining questions of aggressors or innocent parties.
Courts are not justified in making exceptions for 'aggressors' where

202. Upchurch v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 783 A.2d 623, 628 (D.C. 2001) (citations
omitted).
203. BirdII, H&AS No. 84-96, at 6.
204. Samuel B. Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmens' Compensation Laws, 41
ILL. L. REV. 311, 347 (1946) (footnote omitted).
205. See Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., 53 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Neb. 1952).
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the legislature has not done so by express provisions. An assault that
arises out of work-arguments as distinguished from personal grudges,
is clearly causally related to the employment, regardless of who
strikes the first blow, and hence 'arises out of the employment.
Furthermore, to make a distinction between aggressors and innocent
victims adds further complications as to what constitutes an aggressor,
and is judicial legislation in a remedial act intended to widen, not
narrow, the rights of workers. In tort law, who strikes the first blow
may be material on assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
intervening cause, and on other questions. But in compensation
law, the question of 'arising out of' depends simply on the causal
relation to the work, in which the question of 'aggressors' is a court
made, not legislative, exception." 206

Any such distinction is a thinly veiled substitute for blaming the
aggressor.2 0 7
D. Positional Risk
Any distinction between victim and aggressor cannot be
reconciled by the positional risk test. The positional risk test only
applies to neutral risks. 2 08 Therefore, because the Bird test only
compensates work-related fights, there is no need to rely upon the
positional risk test. In other words, pursuant to Bird, in order to be
compensable, the genesis of the fight must be associated with the
employment.20 9 If the genesis of the fight is associated with the
employment, in order for the second prong of the Bird test to void
compensability, being the aggressor must render the activity outside the
scope of employment, but by its plain language, the first prong already
required an employment nexus.

206. Id. at 208.
207. See Alverenga, 2005 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 4, at *13-14 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs.
January 10, 2005) (noting that "[b]ecause of the mutual benefit to claimant and employer,
which was derived from claimant's having been exposed, on a daily basis, to a potentially volatile
interaction with Mr. Martinez, [a co-worker and the aggressor in this fight,] the injuries sustained
as a result of this incident are, potentially, compensable. In that the terms and conditions of the
employment placed claimant in the position wherein he sustained injury from the willful
actions of Mr. Martinez, the injury was incidental to [the claimant's] employment"); Reta, 2000
D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 512, at *23-24 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. November 27, 2000) ("1 find
based upon the evidence in the record, the facts in the instant matter, and the applicable rule in
Bird, that the claimant was not the aggressor, and therefore his injuries arose out of and in the
course of his employment.").

208.
209.
2000).

Georgetown Univ. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Serys., 830 A.2d 865, 872 (D.C. 2003).
Pinto, 2000 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 512, at *13 (D.C. Dep't Emp't Serv. June 29,
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E. Willful Misconduct and Willful Intention to Injure
The statutory defense that is the most difficult to exclude as a
justification for the aggressor defense is willful intention to injure
because there is a natural aversion toward rewarding bad behavior.
Since the advent of workmen's compensation legislation the
majority of courts have denied recovery to the aggressor in an assault.
Various reasons were asserted to support the interposition of this
"aggressor" defense: the employee starting an injurious affray was not
performing any duty for, or advancing any interest of, the employer
and was not hired to incite trouble; rather, the aggressive employee
was acting for his own wrongful purposes and had voluntarily
abandoned his employer's work. This result was not surprising since it
conformed to the common law cliche that one cannot profit from his
own wrong. 210
Nevertheless, despite a statutory exclusion of a claimant's
willfully, intentionally inflicted injuries, 211 close scrutiny of the Bird
test establishes compensability even if the claimant was the aggressor
in a work-related fight. 2 12 The statutory language of §32-1503(d) of
the Act is clear: "Liability for compensation shall not apply where
injury to the employee was occasioned solely by his intoxication or
by his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another." 2 13
The plain language of §32-1503(d) of the Act does not create
an aggressor defense per se nor does it rebut (much less abolish) the
presumption of compensability. There simply is no exemption from
liability for injuries sustained when the claimant is injured "while
willfully violating an Employer's rules nor . . . where the employee

is injured by gross neglect of his duties."2 14 In fact, the same section of
the Act that creates the presumption of compensability creates a
presumption that an injury is not occasioned "by the willful intention of
the injured employee to injure or kill himself or another."215
In Bird, the Director actually did not reach the issue of whether
an intention to fight constitutes a willful intention to injure per §321503(d) of the Act: "Because I find that Claimant's claim for benefits
210.
211.
212.
1985).
213.
214.
215.

Recent Cases, 38 MINN. L. REv. 77, 84 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
D.C. CODE § 32-1503(d) (2001).
BirdII, H&AS No. 84-69, OWC No. 0015644, at 7 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. June 7,

§ 32-1503(d).
See Gomez-Salmanca, AHD No. 08-039, OWC No. 641-284, at *11.
§ 32-1521(4).
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must be denied on the grounds that his injuries did not arise out of his
employment, I need not reach the second issue of whether Claimant's
intent to fight constitutes a willful intent to injure another." 2 16 After
Bird, however, the willful intention language in section 32-1503(d) of
the Act has been used to afford "additional statutory support" for the
Birdtest.217
Remarkably, the willful intention language has not been
defined except in a public sector workers' compensation case decided
six years after Bird.2 18 Ms. Velerie Jones was a secretary at District of
Columbia General Hospital; her job responsibilities included processing
time and attendance records in her supervisor's absence. 219 On August
14, 1989, Ms. Jones argued with her supervisor over her own use of
leave time and accused a co-worker of abusing leave time.220 When
Ms. Jones' co-worker came to the supervisor's office to turn in a
missing leave slip, an argument of heated words erupted between Ms.
Jones and the co-worker:
Ms. LeSane[, Ms. Jones' co-worker,] then called claimant a b - -- -.
Claimant then called Ms. LeSane's mother a b - - - -. Ms. LeSane

walked over towards claimant and shook her hands at claimant and
told her to say it again. Claimant did so and Ms. LeSane pointed her
finger in claimant's face. Claimant pushed away Ms. LeSane's hand.
The two began to push, shove and scratch each other. Claimant's
hand got caught up in Ms. LeSane's earrings and Ms. LeSane's glasses
fell to the floor. Ms. LeSane reached down to pick up her glasses
and, when she did so, claimant grabbed a vase and threw it at Ms.
LeSane. The vase struck Ms. LeSane in the back of her head, although
Ms. LeSane had thrown up her hand to protect herself. The two
began fighting again. [Ms. Jones' supervisor], who was present
throughout the incident and had tried to stop the two from
quarreling and fighting, was finally successful and Ms. LeSane and

216. BirdII, H&AS No. 84-69, at 7.
217. Williams, 1988 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 8, at *3 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. Nov. 23,
1988) ("[S]ince claimant's [(Mr. Ethelbert Williams')] aggressive behavior precipitated the
altercation in which claimant was injured, claimant was not entitled to compensation benefits.

Moreover, as additional statutory support for the Bird test, the [administrative law judge
accepted the Director's reference] that D.C. Code, [§32-1503(d)] provides that liability for
compensation shall not apply where injury to the employee was occasioned solely by his willful
intention to injure himself or another."). The administrative law judge gave no explanation of how
the willful misconduct provision in the Code justifies that support). Id. at 3-4.
218. See Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *3-5 (D.C. Dep't ofEmp't Servs. Feb. 28, 1991).
219. Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *1-2.
220. Id. at *2.
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claimant stopped fighting.22 1

The hospital's defense against Ms. Jones' claim for wage loss
benefits and medical benefits related to her neck and back injuries was
that Ms. Jones' disability was caused by her willful misconduct and,
therefore, was not compensable.222 In analyzing this defense, the
administrative law judge considered the following:
Neither the Act nor its legislative history defines willful
misconduct nor has any case been brought to my attention which
has dealt with the interpretation of these terms or standards to be
applied in construing the willful misconduct language of the [Public
Sector Workers' Compensation Act].
Research reveals that the willful misconduct defense and similar
terms, e.g. serious and willful misconduct, intentional and willful
misconduct, appear in a few workers' compensation statutes. One
state which has similar statutory language is New Hampshire. Under
221. Id. Although decided after Bird and although the Jones case involves a physical
altercation, the Bird aggressor defense is not mentioned in Jones. In fact, in a footnote, the
administrative law judge specifically declined to address the aggressor defense. Id. at *6 n.9. At
that time, the failure of the administrative law judge to apply the Bird test would not have been
noteworthy. Because the Director adopted the Bird test while interpreting the private sector act, it
did not necessarily apply to the public sector cases. Nonetheless, by June 1996, the Bird test was
being applied to public sector cases without recognition of its private sector roots:
An injury resulting from a fight with a co-worker does not arise out of the
employment unless the injured employee and the co-worker worked in an environment
which brought the two together often enough for their temperaments to interact under the
strains of the workplace and which tends to increase the likelihood of friction between
them. Additionally, the injured employee must not be the aggressor.
In fact, the question of willful misconduct is not pertinent to a determination of whether
or not claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment where the
origin of the claimant's injury was the work-related quarrel he had with his assailant.
The work-related quarrel was a direct causal factor in the ensuing assault which resulted
in claimant's injuries; however, because claimant was the aggressor in this case, his
injuries did not arise out of and in the course of employment.
Crowder, 1996 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 268, at *5-7 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. June 11, 1996)
(citations omitted).
222. Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *3. Pursuant to section 1-623.02(a) of the Public Sector
Workers' Compensation Act:
(a) The District of Columbia government shall pay compensation as specified by this
subchapter for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury
sustained while in the performance of his or her duty, unless the injury or death is:
(1) Caused by willful misconduct of the employee;
(2) Caused by the employee's intention to bring about the injury or death of
himself or herself or of another; or
(3)Proximately caused by the intoxication of the injured employee.
D.C. CODE § 1-623.02(a) (2001).
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its workers' compensation statute, an employer is not liable for an
injury to an employee which is caused by serious or willful
misconduct.
In the New Hampshire case of Newell v. Moreau, 55 A.2d 476
(N.H. 1947), the terms "serious or willful misconduct" were
considered. The salient facts of Newell are these. The decedent,
Newell, was employed to supervise truck drivers, one of whom was
one Oscar Palmer who had been at odds with Newell over the
manner in which claimant performed his work. Two weeks before the
incident which led to Newell's demise, an altercation took place in
which Palmer backed the decedent up against a pile of lumber and
verbally threatened him. On the day of the fatal altercation, Newell
criticized Palmer and a verbal argument followed. Newell physically
prodded Palmer to hurry him along. Newell told Palmer "you are all
done." Palmer suggested that the two settle outside. Newell took off
his coat and assumed a fighting stance. Palmer struck Newell and
Newell fell, striking his head and fatally fracturing his skull. The
lower court found that Newell was the aggressor and that his
conduct was of such a threatening nature as to create a reasonable
apprehension of an intent to inflict physical harm on Palmer. The
lower court ruled that claimant's injury and death were caused by his
serious or willful misconduct and, therefore, not compensable. An
appeal was filed.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire determined, however, that
Newell had committed an assault but that it was a simple assault and
not aggravated and further stated that, in determining whether the
assault is serious or willful, it was the misconduct that would be
considered and not the result. It held that the simple assault was not
willful misconduct. In a rehearing in Newell, the court stated that
willful imports misconduct which is deliberate, not merely a
thoughtless act done on the spur of the moment.
In a Massachusetts case, the court had to consider whether a
claimant who lost his eye in a scuffle was guilty of serious and
willful misconduct. The court reasoned that the question of whether a
claimant is guilty of serious and willful misconduct was a question of
fact and that, in determining whether claimant was guilty of such
conduct, consideration should be given to all the "immediately
attending circumstances." It was the court's conclusion that the
findings of the Industrial Accident Board that claimant was not guilty
of serious and willful misconduct was supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the Industrial Accident Board
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was affirmed. 223

The administrative law judge's analysis in Jones fails to provide
justification for an aggressor defense. In Newell v. Moreau, New
Hampshire rejected the aggressor defense:
The defense of "aggressor" is not to be found in our statute or in
other compensation laws. By the application of tort reasoning the
defense has been judicially inserted in some compensation cases. We
have already refused to read in a similar defense in sportive assaults
(Maltais v. Assurance Society, [40 A.2d 837 (N.H. 1944)]) and we
see no reason for its judicial insertion in this assault. 224
Similarly, Massachusetts rejected the aggressor defense twenty
years before In re Tripp's Case:
The striking of the first blow is not the sole and ultimate test as to
whether the injury arose out of the employment. We think it is
possible for an injury to arise out of the employment in the broad
sense of the workmen's compensation law . .. even though the
injured employee struck the first blow. We must constantly remind
ourselves that in compensation cases fault is not a determining
factor, whether it be that of the employee alone or that of the
employee contributing with the fault of others, unless it amounts to
the "serious and wilful misconduct" of the employee which . .. bars
all relief to him. Apart from serious and wilful misconduct, the
question is whether the injury occurred in the line of consequences
resulting from the circumstances and conditions of the employment,
and not who was to blame for it. Our own decisions have long since
passed the point where it could be contended that an intentional assault
upon the employee by a third person necessarily broke the causal
relation between the employment and the injury.... So even where
the employee himself strikes the first blow, that fact does not break
the connection between the employment and the injury, if it can be
seen that the whole affair had its origin in the nature and conditions of
the employment, so that the employment bore to it the relation of cause
to effect.

The administrative law judge in Jones continued the analysis of
other jurisdictions by reviewing case law in Georgia.

223.
224.
225.

Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *3-4 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
Newell v. Moreau, 55 A.2d 476,479-80 (N.H. 1947).
Dillon's Case, 85 N.E.2d 69, 71-72 (Mass. 1949).
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The state of Georgia has a statutory provision which bars
compensation for willful misconduct. [In a case involving speeding
by a police officer,] [w]illful misconduct was defined in Georgia
Department ofPublic Safety v. Collins, 232 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. 1977) as
conduct including all conscious or intentional violations of law
or rules of conduct, obedience to which is not discretionary as
distinguished
from inadvertence, unconscious or involuntary
violations. The court further stated, however, that mere violations of
instructions, orders, rules, ordinances or statutes do not, without
more, constitute willful misconduct. 226
In 1982, the Georgia code provision the administrative law
judge relied upon from Georgia Department of Public Safety v.
Collins22 7 (section 114-105) was recodified at section 34-9-17:
(a) No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death due to the
employee's willful misconduct, including intentionally selfinflicted injury, or growing out of his or her attempt to injure another,
or for the willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or perform
a duty required by statute. 228
Although Georgia has a willful misconduct provision in its
workers' compensation act and although it recognizes a version of the
aggressor defense, its aggressor defense is not based upon the willful
misconduct defense:
[D]efendant in error contends that the director has found that the
claimant was the aggressor in the assault, and, there being evidence to
sustain this finding, under the ruling of Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills v.
Haynie, 43 Ga. App. 579, 159 S.E. 781, this court is compelled to
affirm his decision. That ruling is, "[u]nder the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, a claimant is not entitled to
compensation where the injury to the deceased employee was the
result of a fight between him and a fellow employee in which the
deceased employee was the aggressor. In such a case the injury
was not an accident arising out of the employment within the meaning
of the act." We admit the weight of counsel's argument.
However, we are unable to agree that in every case where the
claimant is in fact, the aggressor in a fight with a coemployee, in
the course of his employment, he should be denied compensation.
It is true that in some cases an active participation of an employee in
226.
227.
228.

Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *4 (footnote omitted).
Georgia Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Collins, 232 S.E.2d 160, 161 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
GA. CODE ANN § 34-9-17(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
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a fight with another employee would constitute an assault and would
label such employee the aggressor. However, it is also true that
in some cases an active intervention on the part of an employee
may be for the protection of his master's property, and in such cases
he would not be guilty of an assault so as to label him an aggressor.229

The administrative law judge in Jones then turned to a Michigan
case:
In Brady v. Clark Equipment Company, 249 N.W.2d 388 (Mich.
1976), claimant [became] irate because a co-employee was telling
other employees that claimant had to obtain a loan to purchase a
camera. Claimant sought out his co-employee. A fight followed and
claimant sustained a skull fracture. The Michigan court held the
claimant's injury was compensable. The rule applied by the court was
that the injury arose out of the employment unless it could be shown
that claimant received his injury while perpetrating a malicious assault
of such gross and reprehensible nature as to constitute intentional and
230
willful misconduct.

The Michigan Supreme Court reversed Brady the year after the
lower court decision was issued. 2 31 Thus, it was bad law when the
administrative law judge cited it.
Next, the administrative law judge turned to a Louisiana case: "In
Velotta v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 132 So.2d 51 (La. 1961),
the court stated that the term 'willful' rules out acts which are
instinctive and impulsive so that even violent blows might fail to give
rise to this defense if sportive and unpremeditated." 232
As the administrative law judge noted, Velotta allowed for
exceptions to Louisiana's aggressor defense.
Significantly, those
exceptions arose out of the general willful misconduct defense in effect
at the time:
The defendant insurer, however, denied that plaintiff was totally and
permanently disabled and also set up the affirmative defense that the
sole and proximate cause of the altercation was words or actions of
plaintiff, Velotta, and that he was therefore barred from
recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act by virtue of

229. Scott v. Travelers Ins. Co., 174 S.E. 629, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934).
230. Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *4.
231. Brady v. Clark Equip. Co., 249 N.W.2d 388 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd, 282
N.w.2d 921 (Mich. 1997).
232. Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *4.
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the
terms
of
LSA-R.S. 23:1081 which provide that no
compensation shall be allowed for "injury caused (1) by the injured
employee's wilful intention to injure himself or to injure
another. . . ."233
Since 1983, Louisiana's aggressor defense has been codified
separately from its defense of willful misconduct:
(1) No compensation shall be allowed for an injury caused:
(a) by the injured employee's willful intention to injure himself or
to injure another, or

(c) to the initial physical aggressor in an unprovoked physical
altercation, unless excessive force was used in retaliation against
the initial aggressor.234
Similarly, none of the remaining cases from Jones that follow
or support the proposition that the willful misconduct language in the
Act justifies an aggressor defense:
In Harris v. Dobson & Company, 132 A. 374 (Md. 1926) the Court
of Appeals said that willful misconduct may consist of a disregard of
rules or orders but there must be something more than
thoughtlessness, heedlessness or inadvertence. In Karns v. Liquid
Carbonic Corporation, 338 A.2d 251 (Md. 1975), the Court of
Appeals said willful misconduct may be found where the employee
intended to place himself in a position whereby he might expect to
meet with injury or death and, in carrying out his intention, meets
his death as a result of the injuries sustained.
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) states that willful
misconduct of an employee "(u)nder Workers' Compensation Acts,
precluding compensation, means more than mere negligence, and
contemplates the intentional doing of something that is likely to result
in serious injuries, or with reckless disregard of its probable
consequences."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1981) defines "willful" as
233.
234.

Velottav. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 132 So.2d 51, 52 (La. 1961).
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1081(1)(a),(c) (West through 2014 Legis. Sess.).
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"obstinately and often perversely self-willed;" "done deliberately;"
"intentional." It imports something more than mere exercise of will
in doing the act, that is, a wrongful intention to do an act that one
knows or ought to know is wrongful or forbidden by law and involves
premeditation and determination to do the act, though known to be
forbidden. An employee may not be guilty of willful misconduct
because he acted imprudently, unwisely, on the spur of the moment or
impulsively.
According to 99 CJS Workmen's Compensation Section 258
(1958), "willful" implies that the action must be intentional, with
a purpose more or less deliberate. It has been held, however, that
while it is true that a willful act, in most cases, may be said to be
wrongful, the intent to do a wrongful act is not a necessary
235

element.

Harris, Karns, and Williams Construction Co., are good law
regarding willful misconduct.
None of these cases, however,
substantiates an aggressor defense created from a willful misconduct
defense.2 36
In Harris, the decedent was a laborer digging a ditch; he had
been told not to work in the ditch until the foreman had shored it up;
however, against those orders, he resumed digging until the ditch
collapsed and crushed him.2 37 Mr. Harris' intentional disregard of rules
and orders was willful misconduct that barred his claim for benefits.23 8
His action, unlike that of an aggressor, was more than thoughtless or
heedless.239
In Karns, the claimant, a truck driver, was injured in a singlevehicle accident that occurred
when
he
was driving
while
intoxicated.240 Intoxication qualifies as willful misconduct and bars a
claimant's request for benefits if the intoxication is the sole cause of the
claimant's injuries, not if intoxication is merely contributory. 241 By
analogy, even if a fight qualifies as willful misconduct, only injuries
sustained solely as a result of throwing the first punch should be
barred.242
235. Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *5 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
236. Id.
237. Harris v. R.P. Dobson & Co., 132 A. 374, 375-76 (Md. 1926).
238. See id
239. See id at 376.
240. Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 338 A.2d 251, 253-54 (Md. 1975).
241. Id. at 253.
242. Willful misconduct could not bar recovery for injuries if the aggressor instigated the
fight with words because words alone could not be the sole cause of an injury.
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In Garrison, the claimant fell from a forty-foot ladder while
employed as a tree trimmer; 243 that the claimant occasionally suffered
dizzy spells as a result of a previous injury did not make his climbing
the ladder reckless and unreasonable so as to amount to willful
misconduct.244
Poor judgment is not willful misconduct whether
climbing a ladder or starting a fight.
Virginia has a statutory defense of willful misconduct, but in the
case the administrative law judge relied on King v. Empire Collieries
Company the Virginia Supreme Court interpreted the section of the
Virginia Workermen's Compensation Act barring recovery for a willful
failure to comply with a statutory duty:
Section 14 of the compensation act (Acts 1918, chapter 400) . . . is

as follows: "No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death
due to the employee's wilful misconduct, including intentional selfinflicted injury, or growing out of his attempt to injure another, or to
intoxication or wilful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or
perform a duty required by statute, or the wilful breach of any rule or
regulation adopted by the employer and approved by the Industrial
Commission, and brought prior to the accident to the knowledge of the
employee. The burden of proof shall be upon him who claims an
exemption or forfeiture under this section."
The paragraph we are asked to construe is that denying
compensation for an injury due to a "wilful failure or refusal to . .
perform a duty required by statute." 245
Like Louisiana, Virginia has codified the aggressor defense
separately from its defense of willful misconduct:
No compensation shall be awarded to the employee or his dependents
for an injury or death caused by:
1.The employee's willful
inflicted injury; [or]

misconduct or

intentional self-

2.The employee's attempt to injure another[.] 246
In Young, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals interpreted
243.
244.
245.
246.

Williams Constr. Co., v. Garrison, 400 A.2d 22, 23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
Id. at 26.
King v. Empire Collieries Co., 139 S.E. 478, 479 (Va. 1927).
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-306(A) (West 2014).
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its willful misconduct defense as it applies to violation of a statute
designed for the claimant's protection:
On the whole we think the evidence shows that the claimant in this
case was fully acquainted with the statute and the rule governing his
employment, and that he deliberately and intentionally violated both
the statute and the rule, as well as the direct instruction of his superior.
Under these circumstances, the compensation commissioner and
the appeal board were in error in awarding compensation, and their
action in so doing will be reversed. 247
West Virginia does not have a general willful misconduct
defense created by statute 2 48 and does not recognize the aggressor
defense: "Where an altercation arises out of the employment, the fact that
claimant was the aggressor does not, standing alone, bar compensation
under the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, for injuries
claimant sustained in the altercation."24 9
Finally, the administrative law judge concluded in Jones:
Viewed against the backdrop of cases cited hereinbefore and the
definitions of the word "willful" and the words "willful misconduct", I
do not find that claimant's conduct was willful. It is clear, in the
instant case, that claimant participated in misconduct but not that this
conduct was willful. As the court observed in Newell:
[t]he inevitable result of associating men together in work
is the same stress and strain that affect human mortals generally.
Arguments, horseplay and some deviation from the planned
schedule are bound to occur: they are compensable (and not
necessarily considered willful) when related to the work. That an
assault may arise from an argument is to be expected as much as
that a battery will occur from horseplay. There is no logical
reason for recovery in one case and denial in the other so long as

247. Young v. State Comp. Comm'n, 14 S.E.2d 774, 777 (W. Va. 1941).
248. Cf Geeslin v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 294 S.E.2d 150, 156 n.4 (W. Va. 1982)
(quoting Thompson v. State Comp. Comm'r, 54 S.E.2d 13 (W. Va. 1949)) ('Wilful misconduct is
not limited to the violation of statutory law or safety rules: it may consist of engaging deliberately,
consciously, or advertently, or with reckless disregard of consequences, in practices known to be
dangerous.' However, Thompson narrowly construed the rule. The court therein awarded
compensation to a claimant who had jumped on a moving train in order to get to his workplace
more quickly, stating that claimant's act was 'inadvertent."'). The West Virginia Court of Appeals
"has been reluctant to find such misconduct." Id. at 156.
249. Id. at 155.
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the injury or death is the result of the employment[.]
The court in Newell also observed:
[a]rguments, altercations and assaults are as inevitable as they are
undesirable. Where they arise out of the employment, they may be
properly regarded as an employment hazard.
Such actions are
misconduct but are not serious misconduct unless of a grave and
aggravated character. Such actions are not willful misconduct unless
deliberate or premeditated.
In the instant case, the facts are in dispute as is the likely case in
fights. I have found, however, that the argument began because
of a dispute concerning use of leave. Words were exchanged. A
finger was pointed in claimant's face.
Claimant reacted
instinctively by pushing it away. The two combatants began pushing
and shoving each other. While Ms. LeSane was reaching for her
glasses and was off guard, claimant impulsively grabbed a vase and
threw it at Ms. LeSane. The fight continued with both parties
sustaining injury. The facts, as found in this case, do not lead me
to believe that the misconduct, which led to the injury, though
wrongful, was intentional or deliberate. 250
Although Ms. Jones' conduct was impulsive, it was not deliberate
or premeditated; therefore, the administrative law judge ruled that Ms.
Jones' conduct was not willful and that her injuries were
compensable, 2 5 1 but more importantly, none of the cases the
administrative law judge relied on supports maintaining an aggressor
defense created by caselaw. Something more than careless instinct is
necessary to qualify as willful misconduct. New Jersey best explains
why a statutory defense of willful misconduct does not conclusively
prevent an aggressor from recovering workers' compensation benefits:
We do not consider that the Legislature meant to punish a
workman for a playful shove, an angry curse, or even an impulsive
slap or punch, by depriving him of compensation. Where the act
does not arise out of a privately motivated, purely personal feud,
where it does not amount to willful misconduct or a willful intention
to injure another (thereby importing premeditated and deliberate
action), it is not for the court to read a new exception, covering

250. Jones, 1991 WL 110033994, at *5-6 (D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs. Feb. 28, 1991) (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Newell v. Moreau, 55 A.2d 476, 481 (N.H. 1947)).
251. Id. at *6-7.
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aggressors, into the clear and unequivocal text of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, R.S. 34:15-7. To do so would be to rule out
negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk and other
common law defenses pre-dating the act, in all types of compensation
cases except those involving assaults. 252
For the most part, on-the-job fights fall outside the
definition of willful misconduct in that they are unintentional,
impulsive acts in response to impassioned employment-related events
or conditions. Unless there is a specific statutory provision barring
recovery by an aggressor, the general defense of willful misconduct is
not sufficient to deny an aggressor workers' compensation benefits; it
merely reinstitutes the tort defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk based on the aggressor's culpability.
CONCLUSION: VIABILITY OF THE AGGRESSOR DEFENSE

The workers' compensation system is designed to provide swift
relief for injuries caused by an event related to employment (including
the conditions of employment and the reactions to those conditions),
and without explicit statutory authority, the Bird case inappropriately
adopted a fault-based defense in on-the-job fight cases, the aggressor
defense. Distinct from the tort system, neither fault nor blame is a
legitimate defense in the workers' compensation system.253
"Prior to 1947, the aggressor defense was accepted by nearly every
jurisdiction in the country[.]"25 4 The justifications were varied-an
aggressor cannot profit from misconduct; an aggressor is not
performing employment duties; an aggressor is not furthering
the
employer's business.255 None of these justifications appreciates
the fundamental tenets of workers' compensation law or the plain
language of the Bird test itself.

252. Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House, 134 A.2d 789, 798 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
253. To call it a no-fault system is something of a misnomer. As mentioned previously,
fault finds its way into workers' compensation in the form of suspension of benefits for failure to
attend an independent medical examination, failure to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation, and
defenses in cases involving horseplay, intoxication, suicide, and a willful intention to injure one's
self or another. Based upon the research in this article, there may be implications for these other
fault-based defenses.
Additional research is ongoing at this time, and comprehensive
consideration of those issues not developed in this article is forthcoming.
254.

Gail Boreman Bird, Workmen 's Compensation: The Agressor Defense Resurrected, 24

HASTINGS L. J. 567, 573 (1973). The aggressor defense still is accepted by a majority of
jurisdictions in the country. See infra app. A.
255. Bird, supra note 254, at 572 (noting a number of examples of past justification for the
aggressor defense).
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The administrative law judge who decided Jones v. District of
Columbia General Hospital relegated to a footnote an important
consideration that virtually would be ignored in future, District of
Columbia work-related fight cases:
I have not addressed the so-called aggressor defense in concluding as
I have. A majority of jurisdictions reject the view that the initiation or
renewal of a fight by claimant deprives the claim of the arising out of
the employment quality. The aggressor defense has also been
roundly criticized as an attempt to insert a fault-based concept into
workers' compensation law. Furthermore, the aggressor defense does
not appear in [the Act] and the fact that a claimant struck the first
blow does not necessarily break the chain of causation when the
incident originates in the employment. 256
By its very nature the Bird test includes only assaults borne out of
an employment environment that acts as a catalyst by bringing the
combatants together in a way that results in a fight. Barring
compensability because the claimant initiated that work-related event
ignores the fundamentals of workers' compensation law including the
presumption of compensability as well as the distinction between an
impulsive, thoughtless, or rash act that is the equivalent of negligence
and an intentional, deliberate, or willful act in order to sever
compensability. If such a distinction is to be drawn at all, it must come
from the legislature not from judicial fiat reintroducing the tort-based
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk into the
workers' compensation system.

256.

Jones, 1991 WL 11003994, at *7 n.9.
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APPENDIX A
257

The Aggressor Defense Across the United States
State

Statute or Case Law or Both

Recognizes
Aggressor
Defense as a
Bar to
Receiving
Beneifts

Alabama

Yes

Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron
Co., 113 So 578, 579 (Ala. 1927).

The decedent was not, when killed, in the discharge of any duty of
his employment, nor in the pursuit of the master's business,
notwithstanding that the original causa belli was connected with
that business. The conclusion we think, is clear that the decedent
was renewing a quarrel because of his purely personal anger and
resentment; and he was assaulted and slain by Henry Anderson for
reasons that were purely personal to him, and not because he was
an employee, or because of his employment, or because he was
engaged in the duties of his employment.
Alaska

Yes

I. ALASKA STAT. ANN.

§ 23.30,120

(20 12).

II. Marsh Creek, L.L.C., AWCAC
Appeal No. 08-001 (Alaska Workers'
Comp. App. Comm'n Mar. 13, 2009)
(footnote omitted), available at
http://Iabor.state.ak.us/wccomm/mem
as-finals/D _101.pdf.

I. (a) In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for
compensation under this chapter it is presumed, in the absence of
257. With the exception of North Carolina, the examples in the following table directly quote
the relevant cases and statutes. Thus, internal quotations are designated with double quotation
marks. In addition, an indent of the quoted material replicates the source's format (i.e., the quoted
material was indented in the original source). When there is a reference to more than one legal
source (e.g., a case law and a statute), the reference is indicated by roman numerals.
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substantial evidence to the contrary, that . .. (4) the injury was not

occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to injure
or kill self or another.
II. The presumption in AS23.30.120(a)(4) exists because AS
23.30.235(1) bars compensation for an injury "proximately caused
by the employee's wilful intent to injure or kill any person." An
injury brought about by acting on a willful intent to injure or kill is
not compensable as an accidental injury. Thus, when examining
workplace fight cases, the board, if sufficient evidence is raised to
overcome the presumption, must determine if the injured employee
acted on a willful intent to injure another. To do so, the board must
determine if the injured employee (1) had a willful intent to injure
or kill, demonstrated by (a) premeditation and malice or (b) an
impulsive conduct that is so serious and so likely to result in injury
that willfulness must be imputed to it; and, (2) did an act that
reasonably could be expected to cause injury to himself or another.
Arizona

No

Colvert v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz.,
520 P.2d 322, 324 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1974) (citation omitted).

Arizona's workmen's compensation laws were enacted to
provide the workman with compensation for injuries "arising out
of and in the course of his employment." The concept of fault and
other common law doctrine based on fault have been eliminated in
the employment setting. To adopt the "aggressor rule" defense
would interject back into the workmen's compensation laws such a
fault concept.

We therefore hold that where injuries are received as a result of
a work related disagreement, the injuries arose out of and in the
course of employment and are thus, by statute, compensable. We
further hold that given the work-related assault, it is immaterial as
to who was the aggressor for to base a defense on such a
distinction would be to interject a fault concept into the workmen's
compensation laws, which concept is completely foreign to the
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purpose and intent of these laws.
Arkansas

No

Johnson v. Safreed, 273 S.W.2d

545, 549-550 (Ark. 1954) (citation
omitted).
Of course, where the aggression of the claimant is so violent as
to come within the express legislative exceptions of wilful
misconduct or wilful intent to injure, he may not recover even
though the assault arises out of the employment. But wilful
intention to injure another usually denotes premeditated or
deliberate misconduct and it cannot reasonably be said to denote an
impulsive or instinctive punch with the fist or similar thoughtless
acts which are trivial in origin though serious in result. The
applicable rule is stated in Larson's Workmen's Compensation

Law, §11.15(d), as follows:
"The words 'wilful intent to injure' obviously contemplate
behavior of greater gravity and culpability than the sort of thing
that has sometimes qualified as aggression. Profanity, scuffling,
shoving or other physical force not designed to inflict real injury do
not seem to satisfy this stem designation. Moreover... the
adjective 'wilful' rules out acts which are instinctive or impulsive,
so that even violent blows might fail to give rise to this defense if
they were spontaneous and unpremeditated.
When the foregoing principles are considered in the case at bar,
we are convinced that the framers of our statute did not intend to
preclude recovery where the aggressive act amounted to nothing
more than a light blow on the shoulder with the first administered
impulsively in a sudden altercation by one who was attempting to
protect himself from serious bodily injury.
We accordingly
conclude that the acts of appellant under the undisputed facts were
not of that serious or deliberate character necessary or essential to
evince a wilful intention on his part to injure [another]."
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CAL: LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(7) (West
2O12).

(a) Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu
of any other liability whatsoever to any person except as otherwise
specifically provided in Sections 3602, 3706, and 4558, shall,
without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any
injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the
course of the employment and for the death of any employee if the
injury proximately causes death, in those cases where the
following conditions of compensation concur:

(7) Where the injury does not arise out of an altercation in which
the injured employee is the initial physical aggressor.
Colorado

No

Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812

P.2d 638, 644, 45 (Colo. 1991)
(footnote omitted).
Judicial recognition of an initial aggressor defense would be
inconsistent with the aims of the Workers' Compensation Act. It
would introduce the common law concept of fault into a
comprehensive statutory scheme designed to allocate cost and
ensure compensation, not analyze culpability. Such analysis of
"who threw the first punch" is contrary to quick and efficient
administration of disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation
Act of Colorado does not expressly authorize a defense against an
initial aggressor in an altercation leading to an otherwise
compensable injury. In the absence of such express authorization,
we decline to read an initial aggressor defense into the statutory
scheme.

An injury sustained in an assault resulting from a work- related
dispute is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act of
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Colorado. In addition, an injury otherwise compensable under that
act is not rendered non-compensable by the fact that the claimant
was the initial aggressor.
Connecticut

No

Stulginski

v. Waterbury

Rolling

Mills Co., 199 A. 653, 658 (Conn.
1938),
The adoption of a rule, that if an injured employee was the
aggressor he could not recover compensation, though the injury
arose out of the conditions of the employment, would require a
definition of terms which would be extremely difficult. Certainly
to hold that no matter what provocation and angry words there
might have been between the parties, he who struck the first blow,
slight though it might be, would be denied compensation would be
neither reasonable nor in accordance with sound principles. That
the injured employee was the aggressor would certainly be a factor,
in some cases an important factor, to be considered in determining
whether the chain of causation between the conditions of the
employment and the injury had been broken. But it would have
that effect as bearing upon the question whether there had
intervened personal motives, designs, or the like, sufficient to
constitute an intervening cause.

Delaware

I DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2353(b)

Likely

(West 2006).
I. Seinsoth v. Rumsey Elec. Supply

Co., No. 0AO9006JOH, 2001 WL
845661, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. April

12, 2001), a.ff'd, 784 A,2d 1081
(Del. 2001).
I. (b) If any employee be injured as a result of the employee's own
intoxication, because of the employee's deliberate and reckless
indifference to danger, because of the employee's wilful intention
to bring about the injury or death of the employee or of another,
because of the employee's wilful failure or refusal to use a
reasonable safety appliance provided for the employee or to
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perform a duty required by statute, the employee shall not be
entitled to recover damages in an action at law or to compensation
or medical, dental, optometric, chiropractic or hospital service
under the compensatory provisions of this chapter. The burden of
proof under this subsection shall be on the employer.
II. Under Delaware law, an employee not participating in such
horseplay may recover compensation for injuries sustained as a
result of another employee's horseplay. An employee who
participates, however, in such horseplay, which is prohibited by the
employer, may not recover for injuries suffered as a result of
horseplay, since the activity is determined to be outside the course
and scope of employment.
District of
Columbia

Yes

Bird II, IH&AS No. 84-69, OWC
No. 015644, at 1 (D.C. Dep't of
EptServs. June 7, 1985).

For the work to "create the relations and conditions which
resulted in the clash", I think that HartfordAccident at a minimum
requires: 1) a showing that the employment required the
combatants to work in an environment which brings them together
often enough for their temperaments and emotions to interact under
strains of the workplace and which tends to increase the likelihood
of friction between them; and 2) a finding that the injured
employee was not the aggressor.
Florida

Yes

Tucker Taxi, Inc. v. Schofield, 107
So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1958) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).

The order of the Full Commission reversing the order of the
Deputy Commissioner is bottomed on the proposition that his
findings do not reflect a 'willful intention' to injure another-the
defense contemplated by the statute-and, further, that the bare
finding that the employee had been the "aggressor" was not
sufficient to bar recovery. This is a play on semantics with which
we cannot agree. The term 'intention' as used in the statute means
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an act that is premeditated and deliberate. The finding of the
Deputy Commissioner that Schofield was attempting to injure his
superior and that this was a deliberate act of aggression is
tantamount to a finding of willfulness in that behalf, and eliminates
instinctive or impulsive acts. The right to compensation turns on
the question of whether Schofield made an assault upon McNally
with the willful intention to injure or kill him.
It is generally held, apart from the express statutory defenses
provided by our statute, that the aggressor in an admittedly workconnected fight cannot recover compensation. Our statute does
little if anything more than to reiterate the rule of the caselaw to
the effect that a subordinate employee engaged in aggression
against his superior thereby performs no service and no duty for
his employer, and the hazard that such subordinate employee may
receive injury from his own acts of aggression against his superior
are not a risk of his employment and, therefore, do not arise 'out
of and 'in the course of his employment.
Georgia

Yes

Scott v. Travelers Ins. Co., 174 S.E
629, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934)
(quoting Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills
v. Haynie, 159 S.E. 781, 781 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1931)).

"Under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a
claimant is not entitled to compensation where the injury to the
deceased employee was the result of a fight between him and a
fellow employee in which the deceased employee was the
aggressor. In such a case the injury was not an accident arising
out of the employment within the meaning of the act." We admit
the weight of counsel's argument. However, we are unable to
agree that in every case where the claimant is in fact, the aggressor
in a fight with a coemployee, in the course of his employment, he
should be denied compensation. It is true that in some cases an
active participation of an employee in a fight with another
employee would constitute an assault and would label such
employee the aggressor. However, it is also true that in some cases
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an active intervention on the part of an employee may be for the
protection of his master's property, and in such cases he would not
be guilty of an assault so as to label him an aggressor.
HlaAaii

Yes

1. RAW. REv.' STAT. § 386-3(b)
(West, Westlawv
through 2014

&

11. Souza, 2008 HI Wrk. Comp.
LEXIS 63, a *12-13 (Haw. Labor
Industrial Relations Aug. 7, 2008).
I. (b) No compensation shall be allowed for an injury incurred by
an employee by the employee's wilful intention to injure oneself or
another by actively engaging in any unprovoked non-work related
physical altercation other than in self-defense, or by the
employee's intoxication.
II. Claimant was the aggressor on September 14, 2005. [Based
upon conditions and tensions arising out of employment on a
construction site,] Claimant was looking to start a fight with Mr.
Lopez.

[A]ny injuries sustained by Claimant on September 14, 2005 were
the result of his own intentional acts in starting a confrontation with
Mr. Lopez, Claimant's threatening remarks about Mr. Lopez,
Claimant's approaching Mr. Lopez's truck in a threatening manner,
Claimant's attempt to strike Mr. Lopez while he was still in the
truck, and then continuing to attack Mr. Lopez, who tried to stop
the attack and acted in self- defense.

Any injuries sustained by Claimant on that date were the result of
his wilful intention to injure another and are not compensable.
Claimant's intention to injure another can be readily established
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by his interactions with Mr. Lopez, his verbal threats and
attempts to strike Mr. Lopez, and the seriousness of the damage
to property caused when Claimant attempted to maintain his
attacks against Mr. Lopez.
Idaho

Yes

IDAHO

CODE ANN.

§ 72-209(3)

(2006).
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this section
shall also extend to the employer's surety and to all officers,
agents, servants and employees of the employer or surety, provided
that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in any case
where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or
unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers,
agents, servants or employees, the loss of such exemption applying
only to the aggressor and shall not be imputable to the employer
unless provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer
was a party thereto.
Illinois

Yes

Tnangle Auto Painting & Trmming
Co. v. Indust. Comni'n, 178 N.E.
886, 889 (Ill. 1931).

Injuries compensable are those arising out of the conditions
under which the employee is required to work, and may properly
include injuries arising out of a fight in which the injured
employee was not the aggressor, when the fight was about the
employer's work in which the employees were then engaged, but it
is not within the intent of the act that an employee be protected
against the consequences of a fight in which he was the aggressor,
though the fight be over matters of his employer's work in which
such employees are then engaged. The risk of injury in such a case
cannot be said to be incidental to the employment, but rather the
result of such employee's own rashness.
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B~erryman v. Fettig Canning Corp.,

399 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1-d. Ct. App.
'1980)
An employee injured in a fight with a fellow employee in which
the employee is found to be the aggressor cannot have
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Iowa

Yes

'_I. IOWA CODE § 85,16(l) (West:
2-009).
II. Maresh, 1995 IA Wrk. Comp.
LEXIS 91, at *12-17, 22-23 (Office
~of Ia. Workers' Comp. Comm'n
May 31, 1995).

I. No compensation under this chapter shall be allowed for an
injury caused:
(1) By the employee's willful intent to injure the employee's self
or to willfully injure another.
II. The undersigned believes it is important that there seems to be
no dispute to the fact that after the parties had their original
discussion claimant's brother [(a co-worker)] left defendant
employer's office of claimant and went into other parts of the plant
and soon thereafter the claimant followed him. Claimant obviously
was upset, angry and felt his character was impugned by the
comment or conversation of his brother. The dispute between the
parties is who swung at who first or made the first initial contact
which ultimately resulted in claimant ending up on the floor with
his head being hit against the floor.

The undersigned believes one of the most important factors as
to this incident wouldn't even have occurred or at least occurred at
the particular place and time that it did if claimant had not left his
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office and had stayed in his office and not eventually follow his
brother out of the claimant's office. Although claimant obviously
was upset and angry, it was claimant's action on leaving his office
that resulted in the confrontation that in fact took place.
It appears from the evidence that claimant, upon leaving his
office, was looking for another confrontation with his brother.
When his brother allegedly came towards him and grabbed him, the
brother commented to the claimant that the results might be the
same as a confrontation claimant had with another employer
sometime earlier. The undersigned believes the inference is that
the claimant got the worse of that situation physically and that
might happen in this situation. There is no question that claimant
voluntarily followed his brother from his office and there was no
other reason the undersigned could determine other than that he
was going to confront his brother. From the animosity that
obviously existed between the claimant and his brother, one could
conclude that claimant was going to have a confrontation with his
brother and that this confrontation would result in some physical
contact in which an employee would be injured, the employee
being either claimant or his brother. The undersigned feels that this
might be stretching the interpretation of 85.16(1) and result in an
injury to the claimant or to his brother. The undersigned does not
believe that it was claimant's intent to injure himself but he
intended to confront his brother and again with the animosity
existing it would not be far fetched to believe that physical
altercation would and was going to take place and an injury could
be expected.

The undersigned also finds that the defendants have proven
their affirmative defense per 85.16(1) on the basis that the claimant
willfully intended to leave his office after the verbal confrontation
with his brother and that he intended to have a confrontation with
his brother and it would be reasonable for him to expect that there
would be a physical confrontation in which he could expect to
injure himself or willfully injure another.
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Per the above finding, the undersigned finds that claimant did
not incur an injury which arose out of and in the course of his
employment on February 7, 1991. The undersigned also finds that
there was no causal connection as to claimant's alleged work injury
and the disability which he claims he has.

It is further found that the injury was also caused by the
employee's (claimant) intent to injure the employee's self or
wilfully injure another as claimant. After an initial conversation or
discussion with another employee, claimant's brother, an angry and
irritated claimant followed the employee and should have known
or expected to have a confrontation with said employee and should
have reason to expect such confrontation would have resulted in a
physical confrontation which the employee should reasonably
know could cause him serious physical injury.
Kansas

Yes

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 44-501(a)(1)(E)

(West 2008).
(a)(1)Compensation for an injury shall be disallowed if such injury
to the employee results from . . . (E) the employee's voluntary

participation in fighting or horseplay with a co-employee for any
reason, work related or otherwise.
Kentucky

Yes

L KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 342.690(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
I. Hall v. Clark, 360 S.W.2d 140,
141 (Ky. 1962).
I. If an employer secures payment of compensation as required by
this chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to
the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of
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such injury or death. . . . The liability of an employer to another
person who may be liable for or who has paid damages on account
of injury or death of an employee of such employer arising out of
and in the course of employment and caused by a breach of any
duty or obligation owed by such employer to such other shall be
limited to the amount of compensation and other benefits for which
such employer is liable under this chapter on account of such injury
or death, unless such other and the employer by written contract
have agreed to share liability in a different manner.
II. [I]t is clear that whatever ill feeling existed between West and
Clark had its origin and its nurture in their employment, and not in
circles outside the place of their employment.
While society is reluctant to reward an aggressor ordinarily,
just when the aggression begins is another question. In the instant
case, did the aggression begin when West ran through the lone
puddle in the road and sloshed its contents at Clark? Or did it
begin when Clark struck West? Or was it when West shot Clark
after they had been separated?
Where the fight arises
spontaneously after prolonged ill feeling on the job as it did here, it
is difficult to conclude that the aggressor (assuming he can be
ascertained) actually has so taken himself out of the scope of his
employment as to justify denying his dependents compensation.
Louisana

Yes

LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1081 (West
through 2014 Legis. Sess.).

(1) No compensation shall be allowed for an injury caused
(c)
to the initial physical aggressor in an unprovoked physical
altercation, unless excessive force was used in retaliation against
the initial aggressor.
Maine

Yes

Gray's Case, 121 A. 556, 557 (Me.

1923).
Claimant's injury arose, not out of his employment as a
contributing proximate cause, but in broadest view only in the
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course of that employment. When his antagonist fled, the quarrel
ceased. Not content, however, to leave the matter stand, the
claimant pursued his vanquished though still insulting foe, and
becoming himself the assailant waged action anew.
This was aside from any duty relating to his contract of service
as a backtender, either directly or indirectly. It was aside from any
risk immediately connected with his work and flowing therefrom
down the channel of natural result; apart from any protection of his
employer's interests; it was unrelated to his employment even
incidentally. It was, in the angle of the existing situation, the
claimant's purely personal affair, voluntary and perhaps
disciplinary in its inception, certainly painfully disastrous in its
ending. Injuries resulting in the course of employment from
assaults to gratify feelings of resentment or enmity are not
compensable.
MTaryland

Hill v. Liberty Motor & Eng'g
Corp., 45 A.2d 467, 472 (Md.

Yes

1946) (citations omitted).

In the case at bar the employment did not require the deceased
to be at the place where the injury occurred, a place provided for
changing clothes and, according to the testimony before us, Hill
never changed his clothes either before or after work. Neither did
the work in any way cause the horse-play[, a violent scuffle,] as in
many of the cases cited, such as air hose cases. The horse-play in
the case at bar [an assault] is the kind which could very well have
occurred at any place in no way connected with the employment.
According to the evidence before us, the injury was not caused by
the act of a fellow employee, but by the act of the injured himself.
Massachusetts

No

Dillon's Case, 85 N.E.2d 69, 71-72
(Mass. 1949) (citations omitted).

The striking of the first blow is not the sole and ultimate test as to
whether the injury arose out of the employment. We think it is
possible for an injury to arise out of the employment in the broad
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sense of the workmen's compensation law ... even though the
injured employee struck the first blow. We must constantly remind
ourselves that in compensation cases fault is not a determining
factor, whether it be that of the employee alone or that of the
employee contributing with the the fault of others, unless it amounts
to the 'serious and wilful misconduct' of the employee which . .. bars
all relief to him. Apart from serious and wilful misconduct, the
question is whether the injury occurred in the line of consequences
resulting from the circumstances and conditions of the employment,
and not who was to blame for it. Our own decisions have long
since passed the point where it could be contended that an
intentional assault upon the employee by a third person necessarily
broke the causal relation between the employment and the
injury.... So even where the employee himself strikes the first
blow, that fact does not break the connection between the
employment and the injury, if it can be seen that the whole affair
had its origin in the nature and conditions of the employment, so
that the employment bore to it the relation of cause to effect.
SMichigan

No

Stewart

v.

Chrysler

Corp.,

87

N.W.2d 117, 118-119 (Mich. 1957).
Larson refers here, of course, to Dillon's Case, 324 Mass 102
(85 NE2d 69), from which I quote with intent of adoption as
follows:
"The striking of the first blow is not the sole and ultimate test
as to whether the injury arose out of the employment. We must
constantly remind ourselves that in compensation cases fault is not
a determining factor, whether it be that of the employee alone or
that of the employee contributing with the fault of others, unless it
amounts to the 'serious and wilful misconduct' of the employee
which. .. bars all relief to him. Apart from serious and wilful
misconduct, the question is whether the injury occurred in the line
of consequences resulting from the circumstances and conditions
of the employment, and not who was to blame for it.... So even
where the employee himself strikes the first blow, that fact does
not break the connection between the employment and the injury, if
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it can be seen that the whole affair had its origin in the nature and
conditions of the employment, so that the employment bore to it
the relation of cause to effect."
Minnuesota -

No

Jolly v: Jesco, Inc., 1357N.W.1d'

Since our Workmen's Compensation Act does not expressly
grant [the aggressor] defense to an employer, we adopted the view
that the death arose "out of and in the course of employment"
within the meaning of Minn. St. 176.021, subd. 1, without regard
to aggression. We said ([in Petro v. Martin Baking Co.,] 239
Minn. 307,311, 58 N.W.[2d] 735):
"When the accumulated pressures of work-induced or workaggravated strains and frictions finally erupt into an affray which
results in injury to one of the participants, it is artificial to say that
an injury to the one who struck the first blow did not arise out of
the employment but an injury to the recipient of that blow did arise
out of the employment."
...

[A]lthough the decedent was the instigator and continuous

aggressor, the assault was clearly rooted in the work and not a
personal affair. Moreover, the nature and spontaneity of the
assault makes the arguments for allowing benefits in this case
stronger than in Petro. We are not inclined to depart from our
prior decision as relators urge. To do so would inject the concept
of fault into legislation designed to eliminate common- law
defenses and to shift the burden of work injuries to the cost of
industrial production. It would also give rise to a host of
perplexing issues including that of determining who was the
aggressor. Furthermore, since Petro and Cunning v. City of
Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876, where the problem was
again extensively reviewed and the intention of the statutory
provision under review examined, the legislature has not seen fit to
provide that aggression, unlawful conduct, or willful intention to
injure another be a defense to recovery of benefits. No persuasive
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reasons are advanced why the defense of aggression should be
imposed by judicial decision, and we decline to do so.
Mississippi

Fisher, 2011 WL 561292, at *5
(Miss. Workers Comp. Coni'n
Jan. 19, 2011) (citations omitted).

Likely

This is a fight between co-workers and it is apparent from the
testimony and the credibility of the witnesses that the subject
matter of the quarrel was not related to the employment. The
Employer and Carrier witnesses corroborated each others
testimony that when the Claimant came into work the morning of
December 2, 2008, he was angry. Both Mr. Downing and Mr.
Gowdy testified they expected trouble from the Claimant. In
addition, there was testimony from both Mr. Downing and Mr.
Gowdy that the Claimant threw the first punch and said he was
Under Mississippi Workers'
going to "beat Bill's ass."
Compensation Law no compensation shall be payable if it was the
willful intention of the employee to injure himself or another. The
Claimant provided no testimony other than his own that Mr.
Downing instigated the attack. When a claimed injury is denied by
the employer, and the claimant presents to a hearing without any
evidence of substance other than his own testimony, that claimant
cannot prevail unless his testimony is credible and consistent, is not
substantially disputed and is reasonable within the factual setting
of the claim. In this case, the Claimant's version of events was
substantially disputed.
Missouri

Yes

I. Mo. ANN. STA. § 287.120(1)
(West, Westlaw through 2014

Legis. Sess.).
I. McCutchenv. Peoplease Corp.,
195 S.W.3d 421,425 (Mo. Ct. App.
2006) (Citations om-itted).

I. (1) The term "accident" as used in this section shall include, but
not be limited to, injury or death of the employee caused by the
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unprovoked violence or assault against the employee by any
person.
II. [I]f the assault was provoked by the claimant he is not entitled
to benefits under the workers' compensation statute. The claimant
does not need to actually strike his assailant first to be considered
the initial aggressor. Furthermore, an employee reacting violently
to a verbal assault can be considered as the initial aggressor.
Montana

No

Kuykendall, 1997 MTWCC 12, at
*8-9 (Mont. Workers' Comp. Ct.
Mar. 17, 1997) (citations omitted).

[T]he Montana Supreme Court has not held that the aggressor is
automatically precluded from receiving workers' compensation
benefits. Only a minority of jurisdictions continue to allow the
aggressor defense as an absolute bar to recovery. Larson explains
the practical difficulties in applying the aggressor defense as
follows:
"[L]ong after a quarrel is over, it is often almost impossible to
determine who really started it. Many a parent [has] been forced to
sit in belated judgment on this issue between two children, the
testimony consisting of 'He hit me'; 'Yes, but she called me a
stinker'; 'But before that he grabbed my book'; and so on. One
cannot read the facts behind the aggressor cases without seeing
how closely the average factory scuffle follows this pattern."
Nebraska

No

Myszkowski v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,
53 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Neb.
1952).

Suggestion is also made that claimant was the aggressor. We
do not so find. But even if such were true it would not necessarily
defeat recovery.
As stated in 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's
Compensation, § 266, p. 768: "The fact that the assault was
provoked by the employee, or that he was the aggressor in the
affray, does not necessarily render the injury noncompensable,
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although it may do so where such provocation or aggression
amounted to wilful misconduct."
As stated in 4 NACCA Law Journal 53: "Where the assault is
directly connected with the work, and arises out of work- quarrels,
as distinguished from personal quarrels, the assault is compensable
without determining questions of aggressors or innocent parties.
Courts are not justified in making exceptions for 'aggressors'
where the legislature has not done so by express provisions. An
assault that arises out of work- arguments as distinguished from
personal grudges, is clearly causally related to the employment,
regardless of who strikes the first blow, and hence 'arises out of
the employment. Furthermore, to make a distinction between
aggressors and innocent victims adds further complications as to
what constitutes an aggressor, and is judicial legislation in a
remedial act intended to widen, not narrow, the rights of workers.
In tort law, who strikes the first blow may be material on
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, intervening cause, and
on other questions. But in compensation law, the question of
'arising out of' depends simply on the causal relation to the work,
in which the question of 'aggressors' is a court made, not
legislative, exception."
Nevada

Likely

Mauer v. Employers Ins. Co. of
Nev., 983 P.2d 411, 411, 413 (Nev,
1999) (footnotes omitted).

This appeal asks us to decide whether a self-inflicted
workplace injury resulting from an employee's impulsive, angry
act is compensable under Nevada's workers' compensation law.
We conclude it is not.

[That a] self-inflicted injury under the circumstances of these
cases is not the result of an "accident" fits well with this state's
statutory definition of that term. NRS 616A.030 defines "accident"
as "an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and
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violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time
objective symptoms of an injury." What is missing in this case...
is the element of unexpectedness or unforeseeability. The result of
Mauer's angry act cannot be characterized as either unexpected or
unforeseeable. Thus, we hold that an intentional violent act that
produces a foreseeable and reasonably expected self-injury is not
an "accident" and the resulting injury is not covered under
Nevada's workers' compensation law.
New
Hampshire

'No

'Newell <v, Moreau, 55 AN.2d 476,
479-480 (N.H. 1947) (citation
omnitted).
K

The defense of "aggression" is not to be found in our statute or in
other compensation laws. By the application of tort reasoning the
defense has been judicially inserted in some compensation cases.
We have already refused to read in a similar defense in sportive
assaults and we see no reason for its judicial insertion in this
assault.
New Jersey

No

Martin v. Snuffy's Steak House,
134 A.2d 789, 798, 799 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957)
(citation omitted).

We do not consider that the Legislature meant to punish a
workman for a playful shove, an angry curse, or even an impulsive
slap or punch, by depriving him of compensation. Where the act
does not arise out of a privately motivated, purely personal feud,
where it does not amount to willful misconduct or a willful
intention to injure another (thereby importing premeditated and
deliberate action), it is not for the court to read a new exception,
covering aggressors, into the clear and unequivocal text of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. To do so would be to rule out
negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk and other
common law defenses pre-dating the act, in all types of
compensation cases except those involving assaults.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol32/iss1/4

74

Jones: Injecting Fault into a No-Fault System: The Aggressor Defense in
2014]

THE AGGRESSOR DEFENSE

165

The aggressor defense in assault cases, except in the limited
number of situations to which we have referred, is out of harmony
with the modem view of industrial responsibility to employees
who suffer work- connected injuries. In our view there is no
reason for our courts to get caught up, as have so many other
jurisdictions, in the endless quest to determine the hairline
difference between aggressors and non-aggressors, with all the lack
of logic, inconsistency and often injustice which attend such effort.
As we read our appellate cases of recent years, their clear purpose
is to give the words "arising out of and in the course of'
employment the broad construction which our Workmen's
Compensation Act intended.
New Mexico

Yes

Lee, 2002 WL 32069739, at *2
(N.M. Workers' Comp. A-mdin.
Feb. 15, 2002),

Worker is not entitled to any benefits. This is because
Worker's injuries were incurred as a result of an altercation with
another employee initiated by Worker.
The altercation was
contrary to Employer's policies and constituted an abandonment of
the course of employment.
New York

No

Comm'r of Taxation & Fin. v.
Bronx Hosp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 120,
122-123 (App. Div. 1950).

In the case before us we think it is entirely immaterial whether
decedent be viewed as the aggressor or the innocent victim. Our
statute contains no defense that an "aggressor" or "participant" is to
be denied recovery in horseplay cases or those of malicious
assaults. Its insertion is purely judicial, justified by no legislative
fiat, and sustained only by the court's conclusion that culpable
persons should not benefit by their own wrong-the very defense
that the compensation act rejects.
Negligence or guilt or
assumption of risk are all banned as defenses in our compensation
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law. The victim of work-inducted assaults should be given
compensation rights, without importing narrow common-law rules
barring an aggressor, and without indulging in mental gymnastics
to determine who struck the first blow. Using the word "aggressor"
as a defense to an award is to bring back into the compensation law
common law defenses which have been outlawed.
North
Carolina

No

Rankin v. Brown Mfg. Co., 193
S.E. 389 (N.C. 1937).

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed and set aside an
order of the Superior Court of Cabarrus County which had directed
the North Carolina Industrial Commission to make specific
findings regarding whether the deceased or the other participant in
a fight was the aggressor; such findings are "manifestly
immaterial."

Yes

N.D. CENT. CODE §65-01
I02(10)(b)(4) (2010.

-

North Dakota

(b) The term [compensable injury] does not include:

(4) [a]n injury that arises out of an altercation in which the
injured employee is an aggressor. This paragraph does not
apply to public safety employees, including law enforcement
officers or private security personnel who are required to engage
in altercations as part of their job duties if the altercation arises
out of the performance of those job duties.

Ohio

Yes

Lowe V. Cox Paving, Inc., 941
N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010).

"[A]n injury that results from an animosity fueled by both personal
and work-related quarrels should be compensable when the workrelated quarrel exacerbated the situation and, thus, establishes a
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causal connection between the injury and the employment."
[A]ppellant must present facts establishing that he was not an
instigator of the assault.
Olahoma

Yes

Terry Motor Co. v. Mixon, 361
P.2d 180, 181 (Okla. 1961).

An injury inflicted upon a workman engaged in the duties of
his employment through an assault or prank of a co-employee is
regarded as one arising out of employment within the meaning and
purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act unless the injured
workman acted as the aggressor, initiator or voluntary participant
in the frolic or combat in which he was injured.
Oregon

Yes

d.
OR.
REV.
STAn t
65.0(7()A (West 2003).
11. OR. REv. STAT. § 656.018(3)(a)
*(West

2003)Y

111. Kessen v, Boise Cascade Corp.,
693 P.2d 5,~ 53 (Or.
.~ App.
4*1984),~.4

1. (b) "Compensable injury" does not include

. .. (A) [i]njury to
any active participant in assaults or combats which are not
connected to the job assignment and which amount to a deviation
from customary duties.

11. (3) The exemption from liability given an employer under this
section .. . shall not apply:
(a) If the willful and unprovoked aggression by a person otherwise
exempt under this subsection is a substantial factor in causing the
injury, disease, symptom complex or similar condition.
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III. [Oregon Revised Statute §656.005(7)(b)(A)]-often referred to
as the "aggressor defense"-clearly contemplates a four-part test.
In order to be barred from receiving compensation, (1) the
claimant must be an active participant, (2) in assaults or combats,
(3) which must not be connected to the job assignment and (4)
which must amount to a deviation from customary duties.
Sclueller v. Amour &
Pennsylvania
Co., 176 A.

NO

]527,
S

529 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1i935).

Even assuming that decedent struck the first blow, it still was an
altercation which grew out of the business and not as the result of a
personal animosity. In Meucci v. Gallatin Coal Co., [123 A. 766
(Pa. 1924)], where a controversy arose between the foreman and
the employee as to the number of cars taken out by the employee,
the fact that claimant struck the first blow and in turn was struck by
the foreman, resulting in the loss of an eye, did not bring the facts
within the exception of the act [for injuries caused by a third
person because of a personal reason rather than an employmentbased reason]. In Vordy v. Joseph Horne Co., 96 Pa. Super. 550
[(Pa. Super. Ct. 1929)], where a dispute arose over the absence of
paper towels, and finally without being attacked the other
employee struck decedent with a piece of pipe and killed him,
compensation was sustained. In Dalton v. Gray Line Motor Tours,
95 Pa. Super. 289 [(Pa. Super. Ct. 1929)], Judge Gawthrop said:
"The mere fact that claimant touched Heaton's arm did not make
him such a violator of the law as to deprive him of compensation.
It was not so serious an offense as to cause the claimant to lose his
status as an employee and become a criminal, bringing upon
himself the injury for which he seeks compensation."
In the
present case the fact that decedent struck first (assuming it to be
true) was not such an assault under the circumstances as would
exclude him or his dependents from compensation.
Rhode Island

Likely

Gaudette v. Glas-Kraft, Inc.,163
A.2d 23, 24-25 (R.I. 1960).

While petitioner was [washing his hands at a sink only large
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enough for two people,] another fellow employee, Albert
Ducharme, came between [the petitioner and a co-worker] and
pushed petitioner away from the sink. The petitioner thereupon
grabbed Ducharme by the shirt and pushed him away. He then
dropped his hand and while he was talking to another employee he
was struck in the face by Ducharme. As a result of the blow
petitioner suffered a broken nose and was totally incapacitated for
work for a period of a little over a month.

Assuming that the use of the sink was incidental to petitioner's
employment, the question whether the assault was caused by the
use of the sink or from some other cause is, in the first instance, a
question of fact. The trial commissioner found as a fact that the
quarrel was a private one; that while petitioner was not the
aggressor, he nevertheless carried on the argument beyond what the
commissioner believed could be said to have been reasonable; and
that in the circumstances he had failed to prove by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that his injuries arose out of and in
the course of his employment, connected therewith and referable
thereto as required by [the Rhode Island Workers' Compensation
Act].
It is reasonable to assume that he based such findings on his
determination from the evidence before him that the assault was
attributable, not to the use of the sink but to the private quarrel
which occurred and was caused by petitioner's action in grabbing
and pushing Ducharme prior to the assault. This assumption,
which we believe is implicit in the trial commissioner's ultimate
finding, is also supported by the decision of the full commission
which stated that "the dispute which precipitated the assault in no
way concerned the work which the petitioner or his assailant was
required to do for the respondent, nor did it concern the conditions
under which the work was required to be performed."
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South

No

[Vol. 32:91

Kinsey v. Champion Am. Serv.
Ctr., 232 S.E.2d 720, 721-722
(S.C. 1977) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).

Carolina

The [statutory provision barring workers' compensation benefits
for injuries caused by the willful intention of an employee to injure
or kill himself or another] does not afford a defense based merely
on who strikes the first blow. Its application is limited to "those
cases where it is shown that the acts of the employee are so serious
and aggravated as to evince a wilful intent to injure."
One reason for the limited application of the aggressor defense
is that the statutory language creating the defense is injury
resulting from "wilful intention" which has been interpreted as
meaning a "deliberate intention or formed intention." If an
altercation is spontaneous, impulsive, instinctive or otherwise
lacking a deliberate or formed intention to do injury, the statutory
defense is unavailable.
South Dakota

Yes

Fuller, HF No. 2, 2012/13, at *2,
3 (S.D. Dep't of Labor Mar. 22,
at
available
2013)
https://dlr.sd.gov/workerscomp/de
c/2_fuller.pdf.

On May 14, 2012, Claimant and a co-worker, Adrian Fornal
(Fomal), were setting forms and tying rebar, while preparing a
driveway for a concrete pour. Before they were finished, Claimant
walked about a block up the street where their foreman, Kyle
Gustafson, was stripping forms.
When Claimant returned to the driveway where Fornal was
working, words were exchanged between Fornal and Claimant. The
exchange was likely related to the fact that Claimant had walked
off before all the work had been completed.
After the exchange, Claimant took off his sunglasses and threw
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them down, then threw his tape measure and hit Fornal with it and
put up his fists. It is more likely than not that Claimant [then]
threw the first punch of a physical altercation which left Claimant
requiring medical treatment.

[Claimant's provocative actions] combined with the facts that
he made no attempt to defuse the situation or retreat prior to
engaging in the altercation and then willingly engage in the fight is
misconduct within the meaning of [the willful misconduct
provision in the workers' compensation act] even if he did not
throw the first punch of the altercation. His actions were a
substantial factor in causing the injury and he had knowledge that
his actions [were] likely to result in serious injuries.
The Department concludes that the injuries Jens Fuller suffered
on May 14, 2012 are not compensable because they were
proximately caused by his willful misconduct.
Tennessee

No

Woods v. Harry B. Woods
Plumbing Co,, Inc., 967 S.W.2d
768, 773 (Tenn. 1998).

[T]he common law aggressor defense as it relates to workers'
compensation
claims under
the
[Tennessee
Workers'
Compensation Law] is abolished in Tennessee and does not bar the
decedent's recovery.
Texas

Yes

I.

TEX.

LABOR

CODE

§

406.032(l)(B) (2006).
II. Fed. Underwriters Exch. v.
Samuel, 160 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.
1942).
I. An insurance carrier is not liable for compensation if: (1) the
injury . . . (B) was caused by the employee's wilful attempt to
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injure himself or to unlawfully injure another person.
II. Our Workmen's Compensation statute . . . provides: "The term
'injury sustained in the course of employment' as used in this law,
shall not include:
4. An injury caused by the employee's willful intention and
attempt .. . to unlawfully injure some other person . . . ."
The above statute is plain and unambiguous. It, in effect, says
that if an employee covered by insurance under our Workmen's
Compensation Law is injured in the course of his employment, said
injury is not compensable if it is caused by the employee's willful
intention and attempt to unlawfully injure some other person.
Simply stated, the above statute means that if an employee receives
an injury in the course of his employment he cannot recover
compensation therefor if such injury results from his making an
unlawful assault upon another person with the intention of injuring

him.
Utah

Unlikely

Prows v. Indus. Comm'n of

Utah, 610 P.2d 1362, 1364-1365
(Utah 1980) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted).
In his treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation (1979),
Professor Arthur Larson (hereafter 'Larson') lists four "actual or
suggested treatments of the problem" of participants in horseplay:
1. The "aggressor defense" which results in the denial of
compensation in any case where the injured employee instigated or
participated in the horseplay. It is reasoned that by instigating the
horseplay the employee has voluntarily stepped aside from his
employment.
2. The New York Rule which permits even an instigator of or
participant in horseplay to recover if the horseplay was a regular
incident of the employment as distinguished from an isolated act.
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3. The view that an instigator or participant should be treated
the same as a non-participant since it is the conditions of the
employment that induce the horseplay.
4. The rule proposed by Larson that an instigator or participant
should recover if, by ordinary "course of employment" standards,
his indulgence in horseplay does not amount to a substantial
deviation from the employment.
As the basis for the fourth approach above, Larson proposes a
four-part test to analyze any particular act of horseplay to
determine whether the horseplay constitutes such a substantial
deviation as to justify denying compensation to a participant
therein. Whether initiation of or participation in horseplay is a
deviation from course of employment depends on (1) the extent
and seriousness of the deviation, (2) the completeness of the
deviation (i.e., whether it was commingled with the performance of
duty or involved an abandonment of duty), (3) the extent to which
the practice of horseplay had become an accepted part of the
employment, and (4) the extent to which the nature of the
employment may be expected to include some such horseplay.
This Court has heretofore had only one occasion to examine the
issue of horseplay in the workmen's compensation setting. In Twin
Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Commission, [196 P. 853 (Utah
1921)], an award of compensation to the dependents of a worker
who was killed as a result of horseplay in which "the deceased was
the instigator and the principal, if not the sole actor" was affirmed
by this Court. The analysis in Twin Peaks turned on whether the
deceased employee could be said to have been killed while "in the
course of' his employment in light of his activities in using an
elevator located on the premises of his employer, the use of which
elevator by the deceased was allegedly forbidden by the employer.
Although the words "deviation from employment" are nowhere
found in the Twin Peaks opinion, it is clear that the Court was
wrestling with the question of when a deviation from the assigned
duties of an employee was sufficient to take that employee out of
the course of his employment. In our view, the analysis in Twin
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Peaks though lacking the formal structure of the test proposed by
Larson is founded on the same general principles. We therefore
adopt Larson's four-part test to determine whether a particular act
of horseplay constitutes such a deviation that it can be said that the
resulting injury did not arise in the course of the employment and
hence is not compensable.
Vermont

Likely

Teixeira, 1997 WL 823704, at *3
(Vt. Dep't of Labor and I-ndus.
Nov. 7, 1997).

In the case at bar, the claimant was taking a [required] break
from work at the time of the alleged injury. The purpose of the
break was rest. The claimant's action [(telling a joke about a coworker's wife)] in instigating the assault [that resulted in the
claimant's injuries] certainly deviated from the purpose of a work
break. The disorder that ensued as a result of the claimant's
comments was a serious deviation and, moreover, constituted a
While the
complete abandonment of the claimant's duties.
claimant has argued that he was merely telling a joke and,
therefore, did not significantly deviate from his duties, that is not
the case. The claimant repeated the comment several times with the
clear intention of provoking Mr. Wade. This is a complete and
serious deviation from his duties. The facts further demonstrate
that the activity engaged in by the claimant was not an accepted
part of the employment. The breaks were intended as a time in
which the employees could relax and socialize, not engage in
insulting conduct by making derogatory comments about coemployees' wives.
Virginia

Yes

Stillwell v. Lewis Tree Serv., Inc.,
624 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Va. Ct. App.
2006) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).

In Farmers ManufacturingCo. v. Warfel, 144 Va. 98, 131 S.E.
240 (1926), the Virginia Supreme Court observed that an employee
is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits "where a
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[claimant] suffers injuries from an assault when the claimant is
himself in fault as the aggressor." The rationale for denying
benefits to the aggressor is that, "in such cases the proximate cause
of the injury is not the employment, but the fault of the claimant."
In other words, if an employee is at fault in causing a fight and is
injured during the course of that fight, those injuries do not "arise
out of' the aggressor's employment because the injuries were not
proximately caused by the employment, but rather, by "the fault of
the claimant."
Accordingly, where a claimant's injuries are incurred during a
fight with another employee, those injuries "arise out of' the
employment only if the fight "[1] was not a mere personal matter,
but grew out of a quarrel over the manner of conducting the
employer's business, and . . . [2] the injured employee was not

responsiblefor the assault."
Washington

No

Johnson, 1993 WA Wrk. Comp.
LEXIS 1119 (Wash. State Bd.
Indus. Ins. App. July 211, 1993).

The aggressor doctrine's focus is simply "who started it". While
such a simplistic approach may appear very appealing, its
application proves more difficult. The facts involving assaults are
often confused, and as in the case involving Ms. Johnson, subject
to conflicting testimony regarding the events. Additionally,
denying benefits to the aggressor fails to take into consideration the
reason the participants are placed in the situation or the reasons
which form the basis for the conflict.
We can see no reason to continue to try to apply the aggressor
doctrine. We are persuaded by the rationale set forth by Professor
Larson which rejects the aggressor doctrine. We believe the better
approach is to abandon the aggressor doctrine and to analyze cases
involving assaults in the work place under a broader course of
employment analysis, thus taking into consideration all relevant
facts.
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No

[Vol. 32:91

Workmen's
Geeslin
v.
Compensation Comm'r, 294 S.E.2d
150,j155 (W. Va. 1982).

Where an altercation arises out of the employment, the fact that
claimant was the aggressor does not, standing alone, bar
compensation under the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Act, W. Va. Code, 23-1-1, et seq., for injuries claimant sustained in
the altercation.
Wisconsin

Yes

Stone, Claim No. 2003-034689
(Wis. Labor and Indus. Review
Coim'n Apr. 14, 2006) available
at
http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/lirc/wede

csns/998.htm.
In short, simply being in a fight at work does not automatically
mean that a worker's injury is noncompensable. However, a
worker deliberately steps out of the course employment if he
"initiat[es] the incident and mak[es] the assault on his own accord."
Wyoming

Likely

I.

WYo.

STAT.

§

27-14-

102(a)(xi)(C) (2 0 13 ).
II. Kilburn Tire v. Meredith, 743
P.2d 874, 877 (Wyo. 1987).
I. (xi) "Injury" does not include . . . (C) Injury due solely to the
culpable negligence of the injured employee.
II. We define culpable negligence as "serious and willful
misconduct" of a "grave and aggravated character."
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